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Under American law, the business corporation has evolved from an en-
tity that the state allowed to be created only as a special privilege, and
even then rigidly restricted in size and powers, to one that the state en-
ables to be formed freely with few limits on size or powers.1 That devel-
opment has been accompanied by varying but persistent public apprehen-
sions about the power of large aggregations of corporate capital. During
the late nineteenth century, the growth of large publicly held corporations
and their involvement in politics inflamed fears of "undue" political influ-
ence by such aggregated wealth.' By the beginning of this century, public
pressure resulted in regulatory restrictions on corporate political expendi-
tures even if authority for such expenditures could be found within corpo-
rate charters.
Until approximately World War II the received tradition of limited
corporate power disfavored expenditure of funds for non-business pur-
poses, including the use of funds to express corporate views on public or
social affairs, whether or not such expression was designed to increase the
corporation's wealth.4 Thereafter, although public fear of corporate politi-
t Weld Professor of Law, Harvard University
1. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-49 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); J.
HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
1780-1970, at 108-10 (1970).
2. See J. SHANNON, MONEY AND POLITICS 25-43 (1959); Lambert, Corporate Political Spending
and Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1036 (1965). Such fears were not unknown at the
beginning of the Republic. See 2 J. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORA-
TIONS 303-08 (1917); Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the
Rule of "One Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (1970).
3. Act of Feb. 1, 1870, ch. 11, 16 Stat. 63; Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. See Bolton,
Constitutional Limitations on Restricting Corporate and Union Political Speech, 22 ARIZ. L. REV.
373, 375-79 (1980); Lambert, supra note 2, at 1035-37; Comment, Corporate Political Action Com-
mittees: Effect of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 26 CATH. U,L. REV. 756,
759 (1977). See also United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570-76 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335
U.S. 106, 113 (1948); State v. Joe Must Go Club, Inc., 270 Wis. 108, 111, 70 N.W.2d 681, 682
(1955) (quoting La Follette message to Wisconsin legislature in 1905 urging ban on corporate politi-
cal contributions).
4. See, e.g., Mobile Gas Co. v. Patterson, 293 F. 208, 226 (M.D. Ala. 1923), afld in relevant
part, 271 U.S. 131, 135 (1926) (campaign contributions improperly included in utility rate base);
McConnell v. Combination Mining & Milling Co., 31 Mont. 563, 571, 79 P. 248, 251 (1905) (direc-
tors cannot charge corporation for lobbying expenses); People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 187 N.Y. 410,
421-22, 80 N.E. 383, 386-87 (1907) (corporate political contribution ultra vires); Bolton, supra note
3, at 375-86. But cf Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974) (statute prohibiting corporate
political payments not bar to contribution in support of or opposition to nonpartisan public referen-
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cal influence did not appear to lessen, and indeed, legislation tightened
restrictions on corporate expenditures for such purposes,5 developing no-
tions of corporate social responsibility altered the direction of corporation
law, as well as the public position of corporate management and of many
seeking to bridle corporate management.6 This movement led to authori-
zation and encouragement of corporate participation in public affairs, in-
cluding politics, in ways that are often only remotely connected with the
corporation's profit-making function." Relying in part upon this growth in
corporate participation in political and social discourse, the Supreme
Court has restricted regulation of corporate political power, and indeed
has fueled the growth of such power, by giving constitutional support to
corporate freedom of speech. In a recent series of cases involving banks
and public utilities,' the Court has stated that the First Amendment pro-
tects political utterances by business corporations as such-whether or not
they are engaged in the business of communication.
Regardless of whether increased corporate participation in the social
and political life of the nation is desirable as a matter of policy,9 serious
doubts exist regarding the validity of the constitutional support thus given
to that movement. That support could significantly reduce the regulatory
power of government over an institution whose existence is uniquely a
function of government authorization, whose power and wealth often far
exceed those of the government that created it, and that has long been a
subject of pervasive government regulation. The logic and the policy on
which such constitutionalization rests invite exploration of the validity of
the teaching of those decisions.
dum); Marsili v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 51 Cal. App. 3d 313, 124 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1975) (expendi-
ture by public utility on referendum permitted by both charter and law); M. HEALD, THE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF BUSINESS 234-42 (1970) (describing business involvement in religion and politics
in 1950's). See also Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (not proper business
purpose to discuss problem of societal racial segregation in proxy statement); SEC Rel. No. 34-3638
(Jan. 3, 1945) (matters of a "general political, social or economic nature" not properly included in
proxy statements).
5. See J. SHANNON, supra note 2, at 98; Bolton, supra note 3, at 402-11; Smith, Business, Bucks
& Bull: The Corporation, The First Amendment & The Corrupt Practices Law, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L.
39, 44 n.26 (1978) (history of Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and post-Watergate
amendments).
6. See Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village? 95 HARV. L.
REV. 597, 598-607 (1982).
7. The problems of corporate voluntarism have been the subject of an extensive literature. See
Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 70 (1979). That the
movement's implications would support, if not justify, managerial discretion in the use of corporate
funds in politics has occasionally been a source of comment. See M. HEALD, supra note 4, at 237-42;
Fletcher, Corporate Political Contributions, 29 BUS. LAW. 1071 (1974).
8. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); cf. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557 (1980); (protecting corporate commercial speech). See also Citizens Against Rent Control/
Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 102 S. Ct. 434, 438 (1981).
9. See notes 6 & 7 supra.
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That the wealth and power of large publicly held business corporations
in the United States have a potent effect on both local and national polit-
ics no one would deny."0 The use of that wealth and power by corporate
mangement to move government toward goals that management fa-
vors-with little or no formal consultation with investors-is also a phe-
nomenon that is generally undeniable." Furthermore, there is good reason
to believe that despite conflicts over particular issues, corporate managers,
particularly of "big business," seek to move government policy in the same
general direction, often independently of party affiliation, on many issues
in areas such as taxes, military expenditures, allocating the costs of exter-
nalities, and a wide range of regulatory efforts. 2 How much, or what
proportion of, stock is held by investors who disagree with their mange-
ment's political views is unknown. Doubtless the holders of the bulk of
corporate stock do not disagree with most political positions for which
their managements spend corporate funds, even when such expenditures
are ultra vires. But the number of shareholders who are likely to disagree
with some of management's political expenditures is not trivial, even if
one takes into account only the present and potential interest of employees
in pension funds and the more direct participants in the "people's capital-
10. See, e.g., IRS Administration of Tax Laws Relating to Lobbying, Part I Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
383 (1978) (business spends $1 billion on grassroots lobbying annually) [hereinafter cited as IRS
Hearings]; FED. TRADE COMM'N CONF., THE ECONOMICS OF FIRM SIZE, MARKET STRUCTURE AND
SOCIAL PERFORMANCE 239-313 (J. Siegfried ed. July 1980) [hereinafter cited as FTC Report]; Vogel,
The "New" Social Regulation in Historical and Comparative Perspective, in REGULATION IN PER-
SPECTIVE 155 (McGraw, ed. 1981). See also H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1976 ELECTION 533-
619 (1979); A. HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 104-17 (1962); S. LYDENBERG, BANKROLLING
BALLOTS (1979); PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, & CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 9-25, 107-84 (M. Mal-
bin ed. 1980); S. SETHI, ADVOCACY ADVERTISING AND LARGE CORPORATIONS (1977); J. SHANNON,
supra note 2, at 13-63; Epstein, An Irony of Electoral Reform, REG., May/June 1979, at 35.
11. See C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 192-97 (1977); Note, Corporate Political Affairs
Programs, 70 YALE L.J. 821 (1961); cf U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Business Response to the Pow-
ell Memorandum, WASHINGTON REPORT, Vol. 12, No. 24, Nov. 26, 1973 (recommending action by
business firms to improve public opinion of American business).
12. See E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 162-86 (1981); C. LINDBLOM,
supra note 11, at 170-200; cf. A. HEARD, supra note 10, at 104-11 (corporate gifts heavily favor
Republicans); Adamany, PAC's and the Democratic Financing of Politics, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 569,
595-96 (1980) (corporate PAC contributions disproportionately favor incumbents and Republicans);
Wertheimer, The PAC Phenomenon in American Politics, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 603, 610 (1980) (corpo-
rate PAC contributions favor incumbents first and Republicans second). But cf Budde, Business Po-
litical Action Committees, in PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS, supra note
10, at 9, 16-21 (corporate PAC spending patterns are diverse); Mayton, Politics, Money, Coercion,
and the Problem with Corporate PACs, 29 EMORY L.J. 375, 381 (1980) (corporate PACs usually
nonideological and back incumbents); Wilson, Democracy and the Corporation, Wall St. J., Jan. 11,
1978, at 14, col. 4 (criticizing fears of corporate influence on politics). Of course, not all corporate
executives see the same world; some prefer, in order either to benefit their firms or to satisfy their own
personal preferences, governmental action that others oppose. See Chandler, The Adversaries, HARV.
BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 85-88; Reich, Why the U.S. Needs an Industrial Policy, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 74; Vogel, supra note 10.
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ism"; if we include the constituencies of those institutions, such as
churches and universities, that are likely to believe that management
should not have discretion to make such expenditures, the numbers are
even larger.14 A government concerned with protecting First Amendment
values could reasonably believe it important to free those citizens from
bondage to management's political views, even if the bonds are seen as no
more than restrictions on their investment opportunities."
That concern appears to have been one stimulus to the legislative re-
strictions that the federal government and the states have imposed on cor-
porate political activity." But those restrictions have been more or less
narrowly aimed at political "contributions" in connection with the election
of candidates to political office; 7 they have not prohibited the varied cor-
porate expenditures that, although not "contributions" to political candi-
dates, effectively condition voters to accept or reject government policies or
candidates. 8 Examples of such expenditures include "issue" advertising or
13. See, e.g., P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION 1-16 (1976) (pension funds of self-em-
ployed, public employees, and teachers own 10% of all equities); Stem, $2.9 Trillion in Pension
Assets by 1995, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS 1, 3, 37 (1980) (In 1975, 48% of all workers participated
in private pension funds owning $103 billion in equities, or 21.3% of corporate net worth). From
1970 to 1980, employee stock ownership in pension funds increased both in absolute terms and pro-
portionately. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, EXCHANGE INTERCHANGE, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 3 (Decem-
ber 1981). See also E. HERMAN, supra note 12, at 138. ESOPs are still another form of employee
stock participation that is growing. See ESOPS Tables: A Survey of Companies with Employee Stock
Ownership Plans, 6 J. CORP. L. 551 (1981). Of 30 million individual stockholders, 40% acquired
stock through employee purchase plans. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, SHARE OWNERSHIP 1980, at i.
14 See E. HERMAN, supra note 12, at 138 (in 1978, charitable foundations and educational en-
dowments owned common stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange valued at $37 billion).
15. See p. 270 infra.
16 To be sure, a primary stimulant to such legislation was the fear of the debauching influence of
"the concerted use of money" by "artificial beings." See Uied States v. United States Brewers'
Ass'n, 239 F. 163, 168-69 (W.D. Pa. 1916). But both legislative history and contemporaneous opinion
evince a hostility to directors' "use [of] stockholders' money for such purposes . . . ." 40 CONG. REC.
96 (1905) (Roosevelt message to Congress urging ban on corporate political contributions). See, e.g.,
Hearings on Contributions to Political Committees before House Committee on the Election of the
President, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1905) (Williams testimony); Bolton, supra note 3, at 377-79
(assessing legislative importance of complaints about management's usurpation of stockholders' assets
for political purposes the latter opposed). See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 81-82 (1975); Note,
Corporate Democracy and the Corporate Political Contribution, 61 IOWA L. REV. 545 (1975).
17. See Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (prohibiting corporate money contributions in
connection with elections). Roosevelt had sought legislation prohibiting nof merely corporate contribu-
tions to any political committee for any political purpose, but any use of funds "in connection with
any legislation save by the employment of counsel in public manner for distinctly legal services." 40
CONG. REC. 96 (1905). There were attempts, in 1925 and in 1947, to extend the prohibition to
contributions not merely of money but to other things of value, see Federal Corrupt Practices Act of
1925, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1071, and to "expenditures," see Amendment to the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act of 1925, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 159 (1947). But these laws did not effectively prevent expenditures by
corporations other than those more or less plainly made for the benefit of candidates for office. See
Bolton, supra note 3, at 386-98.
18. See, e.g., IRS Hearings, supra note 10, at 35-42; Mastro, Costlow & Sanchez, Taking the
Initiative: Corporate Control of the Referendum Process Through Media Spending and What to Do
About It, 32 FED. COM. L.J. 315 (1980) (heavy corporate spending on advertising defeated three
initiatives in Colorado). See also Citizens Against Rent Control/Coaltion For Fair Housing v. City of
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"institutional" advertising,19 "grass roots" campaigns with respect to ref-
erenda or legislation, 0 free use of company employees or facilities, and
payments to outsiders to lobby or to campaign.2 1 Corporations using such
lawful means of generating support for or opposition to government poli-
cies and candidates22 have spent sums large enough to raise significant
questions about the use of stockholders' funds to support political views
that many stockholders do not favor.
2'
The constitutional distinction drawn in Buckley v. Valco between "con-
tributions," which create the possibility or appearance of corruption, and
"expenditures," which it is said do not,24 may be valid for strictures on
individual human beings. But the distinction does not address the problem
of defining the appropriate relationship between corporate political power,
which the nation has historically feared,2  and stockholders' individual po-
litical preferences. In any event, whether corporate management may har-
ness the funds of individual investors to further political or social goals the
latter do not support should not depend upon a distinction between corpo-
rate contributions and corporate expenditures. In either case, unless inves-
Berkeley, 102 S. Ct. 434, 442-43 (1981) (White, J., dissenting).
19. See E. BARNOUW, THE SPONSOR 77-151 (1978) (discussing use of electronic media to promote
corporate views); E. HERMAN, supra note 12, at 406 n.100; Schaefer, The First Amendment, Media
Conglomerates and "Business' Corporations: Can Corporations Safely Involve Themselves in the Po-
litical Process? 55 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1980) (unclear when issue advertising violates corrupt
practices legislation); Comment, Corporate Advocacy Advertising: When Business' Right to Speak
Threatens the Administration of Justice, 1979 DET. C.L. REV. 623, 623-27 (describing corporate
advocacy advertising).
20. See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 102 S. Ct.
434 (1981); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959); Cooper, The Tax Treatment of
Business Grassroots Lobbying: Defining and Attaining the Public Policy Objectives, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 801 (1968).
21. See Lambert, supra note 2, at 1052-59; DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE, SEC, 96TH
CONG., 2D SESS., STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 199-200 (1980) (printed for Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs) [hereinafter cited as SEC REPORT].
22 See Bolton, supra note 3, at 411-12; Note, supra note 11, at 822-27; Note, supra note 16, at
558-79.
23. See G. THAYER, WHO SHAKES THE MONEY TREE? 108-22 (1973); note 10 supra.
24. 424 U.S. 1, 14, 26 (1976). But see Comment, Independent Political Committees and the Fed-
eral Election Laws, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1981) (permissibility of contributions to "parallel cam-
paigns" may undermine effectiveness of federal limits on direct contributions to candidates). The dis-
tinction between ballot or referenda issues and election to office that the Court made in First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978), relates in some measure to the difference between
"contributions" and "expenditures." See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v.
City of Berkeley, 102 S. Ct. 434, 438-39 (1981) ("contributions" supporting or opposing referenda
are constitutionally protected because they do not threaten corruption of candidates); California Medi-
cal Ass'n v. FEC, 101 S. Ct. 2712 (1981); Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974); FEC v.
National Right to Work Comm., 501 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1980); FEC v. Weinsten, 462 F. Supp.
243 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
25. See Schwartz v. Romnes, 357 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir.
1974) (discussing range of behavior state prohibitions against corporate "political" contributions seek
to interdict); Fletcher, Corporate Political Contributions, 29 BUS. LAW. 1071, 1073 (1974); Lambert,
supra note 2, at 1035-38.
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tor approval is obtained, the funds of some investors are being used to
support views they do not favor.
The Court's recent opinions cast doubt on the legality of existing stric-
tures on corporate "contributions"26 as well as on future efforts to protect
individual investors from having to yield their assets to managerial or
majoritarian decisions on all the other political activities in which their
corporations engage. 27 The opinions are cast in terms of protecting the
process of speech or the exchange of communications; the holdings rest on
the notions that, given protected expression, "speakers" cannot generally
be hindered in uttering such expression, and that corporations are such
"speakers." 28
The last proposition is not self-evident. Corporations are accorded "per-
sonality" in order to create a mechanism for saving transaction costs in
business dealings, not to create autonomous beings. Accordingly, they may
be deemed legal "persons" separate from their stockholders for many con-
stitutional purposes, particularly when corporate dealings with third per-
sons involve contract rights, ownership of property, or liability for inju-
ries.29 Moreover, corporations that are in the business of communicating
have special ground for claiming protection under the First Amendment.3
But corporations have not been treated as "persons" for all constitutional
purposes." Indeed, the First Amendment lacks any reference to "person."
And none of the cases invoking it as a shield for the entity's "speech"
involved the relationship of "its" speech to its individual investors' free-
dom of speech. Hence, none has addressed the question of the scope of the
government's discretion, when authorizing the creation or regulating the
26. See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 102 S. Ct.
434, 438-39 (1981).
27. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1981)
(desirable to open "channels of communication"); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783
(commercial speech promotes "free flow of commercial information").
28. See Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533 (1980) (the "inherent
worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity
of its source, whether corporation, association, union or individual"); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 784-86 (1978) ("speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amend-
ment [does not lose] that protection simply because its source is a corporation"); note 62 infra.
29. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (liabiliiy for libel); Wheeling Steel
Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949) (property); Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118
U.S. 394 (1886) (same); Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE
L.J. 371 (1938). But cf Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 245-46 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(corporate interest in enforcing its "personal prejudices" not constitutionally protected).
30. See, e.g., Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); O'Kelley, Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and
Political Expression and the Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347,
1359-66 (1979).
31. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75 (1906) (no privilege against self-incrimination for
corporations); cf Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586-87 (1839) (foreign corporation
cannot claim rights of a person under privileges and immunities clause).
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operation of a business corporation, to allocate the corporation's capacity
to become a "speaker" in a manner that appropriately accommodates the
rights of the individual participants.
To answer that question requires a preliminary observation concerning
government power to regulate the internal affairs of corporations, which
do not exist without the government's authorization.2 Normally the allo-
cation of authority among stockholders, or between stockholders and man-
agers, to expend corporate funds is a function of state law, and on occa-
sion also of federal law. Among the configurations that government might
allow for the allocation of such authority are (1) complete contractual
freedom for the participating investors to make their own arrangements,
(2) restriction of the participants to a prescribed statutory or common-law
scheme for the allocation of such powers, or (3) restriction to such a pre-
scribed scheme coupled with permission for the participants to alter that
allocation, to a limited degree, by their contract.33 While other provisions
of the Constitution may limit the government's power to prescribe the al-
location of decisionmaking authority, the restrictions on government
power contained in the First Amendment do not address, or without more
inhibit, the government's power to determine whether corporate decisions
should be made by officers or directors without even consulting stockhold-
ers, only by stockholders, or only by supermajority or unanimous vote of
stockholders.
32. To recognize the corporation as a set of contractual arrangements by which individuals effect,
more efficiently than would the market, collective economic purposes does not preclude treatment of
the corporation as an entity for many purposes. But in order thus to function as an institution that
implements the aspirations of its participants, the enterprise imperatively requires the government to
foster-and tolerate-it. Yet it is currently fashionable to dispute the notion that the corporation
exists by sufferance of the state, and that it is therefore subject to many restrictions that the state could
not impose on an individual. See Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private
Property Model, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1327 (1979). The argument that the right to incorporate is a
"natural" contractual right of individuals has little support in history and none in logic. As a matter
of policy, society has an interest in regulating the formation and activities of private groups, even for
activities the First Amendment protects, to an extent that is not, and should not be, permitted with
respect to individuals acting separately. This interest is particularly acute with respect to corporations,
if only because of their indefinite existence and limitless size and power. In any event, the internal
allocation of power or votes of individual members with respect to group decisions cannot be solely a
matter of contract if minorities are to be protected from majorities over the life of the enterprise.
Without external mandates to limit majoritarian power, corporate contractual arrangements would
presumably be so wasteful that investors would want, and government would rationally seek, to im-
pose them. See Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 738 (1978).
33. See, e.g., Providence and Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977); Lehrman v.
Cohen, 43 Del. Ch. 222, 222 A.2d 800 (1966); Ellingwood v. Wolf's Head Oil Refining Co., 27 Del.
Ch. 411, 38 A.2d 743 (1944); Stroh v. Blackhawk Holding Corp., 48 Ill.2d 471, 272 N.E.2d I
(1971). The notion that state statutory and common law should restrict the parties' freedom of con-
tract in the interest of protecting minority stockholders against majority use of the minority's assets for
purposes alien to the latter's interest in the common venture is a continuous theme of corporate law.
See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Recent Developments in Delaware
Corporate Law, 3 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 19 (1977).
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More particularly, until First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,34
nothing in the Constitution was thought to restrict the state's power to
forbid management from wasting corporate assets. In that case, however,
in language that went much further than the facts required," the Court
stated that the First Amendment protects corporate speech even if it does
not materially affect the corporation's business, and that the corporate
character of the "speaker" does not legitimize government restrictions on
"its" wasteful speech. On those premises, the Court held unconstitutional
a statute drawn to forbid corporate expenditures opposing a referendum
on a graduated income tax, even though the Massachusetts legislature
found and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the
tax question submitted in the referendum did not materially affect the
property, business, or assets of the corporate litigants.'6
To be sure, there is considerable room for argument over whether any
particular corporate expenditure is "waste." But, as the Supreme Court
acknowledged in the Bellotti case, management might be required to ac-
count to stockholders in a derivative suit for the expenditures there in-
volved." Yet, notwithstanding the state's power thus to authorize sanc-
tions against management after the expenditure is made, the Court stated
that the First Amendment denies the state the power to prohibit the ex-
penditure directly by statute. It is hard to see any distinction of constitu-
tional dimension between forbidding a corporation from engaging in cer-
tain behavior under penalty of criminal punishment for management, and
permitting the threat of stockholder derivative suit against, or ouster of,
management 3 to deter such behavior-unless the concept of prior re-
34. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
35. The Court's opinion alluded to several considerably narrower grounds for its holding: that the
interdicted speech was not waste, see note 70 infra, that the statute was really aimed not at waste, but
at speech, see 435 U.S. at 793, that the statute was aimed only at speech with a particular content, for
which no justification was offered under the equal protection clause, see id., or that the statute totally
suppressed speech, see note 109 infra. The unnecessary breadth of the opinion, if not the holding, in
Bellotti may have been influenced by the views its author held prior to his appointment to the Court.
See Powell, Confidential Memorandum: Attack on American Free Enterprise System, WASHINGTON
REP. SUPP., Vol. 12, no. 24, Aug. 23, 1971 (proposing an aggressive national campaign of corporate
expenditures to influence public opinion in favor of American business) [hereinafter cited as Powell
Memorandum].
36. First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass. 773, 785-87, 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1270-71
(1977), rev'd sub nom. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
37. 435 U.S. at 795.
38. If the government has power to prescribe rules to which the participants in the group must
adhere in allocating authority to act for the group, it can also prescribe remedies for violation of those
rules. The state is not restricted to limiting such remedies to stockholders' derivative suits or to stock-
holders' votes to oust management. Nothing in the Constitution forbids the state from imposing other
civil costs or penalties on management for such managerial behavior. Cf DEL. CORP. LAW § 124
(1974) (allowing restitution in suits for ultra vires activity); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW. § 203 (Consol.
1963) (same).
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straint is relevant. 9 But if that concept is applicable, its invocation invites
inquiry into the extent to which the state may regulate corporate behavior
in deference to differences of opinion among corporate stockholders.
That question implicates, inter alia, the questions (1) whether the First
Amendment restricts the government's power to say who "in" the corpo-
ration is authorized to spend corporate money when the corporation en-
gages in speech in violation of its charter, (2) whether, if state law gener-
ally permits management to make expenditure decisions, the government
can condition expenditures for corporate political or noncommercial
speech in matters that would otherwise be within the authority of man-
agement on the consent of stockholders, and thus effectively prohibit such
speech, and (3) whether the government can authorize management to
make some kinds of corporate speech, such as commercial speech, but not
others, such as political or noncommercial speech, without the approval or
express consent of stockholders.
I. Ultra Vires Speech: Waste
To start with the least complicated configuration, let us assume that
state common law or statutory law forbids waste by corporate manage-
ment, and that it defines waste as expenditures from which the enterprise
cannot reasonably be expected to benefit. Let us assume further a corpora-
tion engaged in, and by its charter confined to, the manufacture of mass-
produced plastic toys. The corporation uses unskilled labor, principally
ethnic minorities and women, who are available at the lowest permissible
wages. The president of the company is personally hostile to minorities
and believes that a woman's place is in the home. He also favors the elec-
tion as Senator of Mr. X, who seeks a constitutional amendment repealing
the equal protection clause, repeal of equal rights legislation, and enact-
ment of state legislation restricting the employment of women and minori-
ties. The president proposes to spend corporate funds in support of Mr. X
and his policies. If those policies prevail, the president can then satisfy his
personal preference against hiring women and minorities, even though do-
ing so not only will fail to benefit the corporation, but will deprive it of a
supply of cheap labor that will continue to be available to competitors in
other states.
39. Management's fear-ex ante-of acting wastefully results from the same uncertainty concern-
ing the "materiality" of the expenditure regardless of whether the threatened sanction is penal or civil.
Moreover, prior restraint contingent upon government license or approval, or based on judicial injunc-
tion against proposed speech, implicates different considerations from those involved when the prior
"restraint" merely requires consultation between agent and principal in order to determine whether
the principal will authorize the agent to speak or will seek to enjoin the agent from speaking.
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A. Prohibitions on All Forms of Corporate Waste
Under venerable doctrine, expenditure of corporate funds that consti-
tutes waste cannot be made lawfully without the consent of all the stock-
holders; any officers or directors who authorize or make wasteful expendi-
tures are accountable to stockholders who object, even if those who object
are only a small minority.40 The fact that the wasteful behavior takes the
form of political speech not reasonably related to the corporation's busi-
ness does not make management's usurpation of corporate funds for that
purpose any less wasteful. Indeed, as noted, the Bellotti decision explicitly
acknowledges that the president can be made accountable to stockholders
for wasteful speech, apparently no less than for any other behavior that
violates a general prohibition against waste.4'
The logic of that conclusion is unassailable; but it bears some elabora-
tion since it implies that the First Amendment permits effective, if not
formal, government prohibition of wasteful corporate speech as part of a
general prohibition against corporate waste. Judicial scrutiny of such a
state law, at least if the law is not invoked discriminatorily, should not be
any stricter than judicial review of a law forbidding any other form of
waste or improper diversion. Although the First Amendment protects the
president's right to express himself, it does not require that the state re-
frain from prohibiting him from stealing in order to obtain the funds to
enable him to exercise that right. Nor does the First Amendment inhibit
the state from obstructing his exercise of that right by denying him the
opportunity to do so with other people's money, 42 or, more particularly, by
denying him the use of corporate funds to cause the corporation to speak
for him.43 So long as the government's mandate is part of a general prohi-
40. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933); Adams v. Smith, 275 Ala. 142, 153 S.2d
221 (1963); Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 518 (Del. Ch. 1978); Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474,
184 A.2d 602 (1962); Kerbs v. California E. Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (1952);
Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 180-81, 128 N.E.2d 291, 297 (1955)
(Van Voorhis, J., dissenting). At common law, a requirement of unanimous consent of shareholders
was not unknown. It "was required for such extraordinary corporate action as the sale of the assets of
a prosperous corporation, a merger, or consolidation, or an amendment changing the business or
altering the rights or preferences of shareholders." R. STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS 566 (2d ed. 1949) (footnote omitted). The unanimous consent of a class of investors is
required in order to alter some of the terms of their contract under the "absolute priority" doctrine.
See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15
U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (1976) (§ 316(b)). But d. Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (Supp. III
1979) (narrowing absolute priority doctrine).
41. See 435 U.S. at 795. See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
42. The same analysis applies to use of corporate funds by majority stockholders to cause the
corporation to finance speech not related to corporate business.
43. Even if he has a right to spend on speech stolen funds that he has reduced to his possession,
cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (prior restraint on publication of
stolen documents unlawful), he does not have a right to compel the owner of the funds to support his
speech by expending those funds on his behalf.
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bition against waste that is applied evenhandedly, its propriety as a re-
striction on the president is no less valid when applied to wasteful speech
made to further his personal views than when applied to any other abuse
of corporate assets by the president, like the purchase of a house for his
children or the violation of the labor laws to satisfy his personal
preferences.44
Neither the public's interest in free speech nor the listener's interest in
receiving messages on "all matters of public concern"4 alter this result. In
the Bellotti opinion, however, Justice Powell invoked the analysis offered
in the commercial speech cases,46 and rejected the state's attempt to rely
solely on its authority to restrict the powers of the corporate speaker. 7
Instead, he insisted that the issue is whether the First Amendment pro-
tects the "expression" from abridgement. In focusing analysis on the ex-
pression, he appears to have been concerned with projecting the audience's
interest in receiving communications and the general public's interest in
the free interchange of information, ideas, and opinions. 48 The state's ef-
fort to protect investors against management's spending funds in ways the
corporate charter does not authorize, or indeed forbids, could not thwart
that "societal" interest.49
But if the First Amendment protects the "expression" from abridge-
ment, it assumes that there is an expression. If there is a right to be in-
formed, it is only the right to hear or to receive what others can and wish
to express. Listeners do not themselves generate the speech that the First
Amendment protects, nor can they be enriched by it, unless willing and
able speakers exist. To be sure, the audience's right to receive prohibits
the government, at least without justification meeting First Amendment
standards, from forbidding or impeding the conveyance of a message that
a speaker is able, and wishes, to utter; 0 that right may even'give a would-
be speaker standing to litigate the audience's rights," or give the audience
44. Cf Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947) (plant closing in order to punish
employees and vent personal prejudice may constitute waste).
45. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940).
46 See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
47. See 435 U.S. at 777; note 28 supra.
48. 435 U.S. at 777.
49. Id. at 785.
50. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster
Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); cf Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969) (right to receive ideas precludes government from punishing private possession of obscene
materials). But cf Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (secrecy restrictions in former CIA
employee's employment contract enforceable); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (Congress
may empower Attorney General to deny temporary visa to Marxist theoretician despite First Amend-
ment interests of those who wish to communicate with him).
51. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith, supra note 5, at 83.
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standing to litigate the speaker's rights." But the audience does not have a
right to compel others to furnish information or expression,"3 to require
others to subsidize its distribution, 4 or to require the government to subsi-
dize it 5 or to generate and distribute it.
s6
52. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976); cf. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(First Amendment protects right to receive publications). See generally United States v. Chestnut, 394
F.Supp. 581, 588-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afTd, 533 F.2d 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976).
53. The government may protect an unwilling recipient by precluding a speaker from privately
pressing "even 'good' ideas" on him through the mails. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept.,
397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970); cf Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943) (dicta) (govern-
ment may punish those who solicit at homes of others contrary to latter's previously expressed will).
But cf Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) (customers may
avoid exposure to objectionable material in billing envelopes by discarding it). This principle would
equally validate state efforts to protect an unwilling speaker from being made to support messages
that others wish to hear.
It does not seriously detract from this conclusion that the disclosure of sources may be compelled in
litigation, see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), that government may permit speech in
public places despite the presence of unwilling recipients, see Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343
U.S. 451, 465 (1952), that the interest of willing recipients in company towns is brigaded with the
willingness of speakers to speak as a justification for striking down prohibitions on the latter's speech,
see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943);
Note, Listeners' Rights Providing a State Action Theory in the "Company Town" Analogues, 55
IND. L.J. 91 (1979), or that the public may be entitled to collect otherwise accessible information and
assemble a mosaic, see United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal
dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
54. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124 (1973); c Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
555 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (government may prevent ratepayers from being forced to sub-
sidize public utility's bill inserts discussing controversial issues). Whether the First Amendment per-
mits government to force an owner of property to make that property available to others for expres-
sion of their views appears to turn on whether the property constitutes a "public" locus of speech or a
licensed medium of communications. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass'ns, 101 S. Ct. 2676 (1981) (letter box not public forum); Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (state may require private shopping center to permit individuals to exer-
cise free speech rights on premises). See also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Cases that have found a public locus of expression or a licensed
medium of communication to exist have found that the rights of the property owner are not violated so
long as he is not visibly associated with the views of those to whom the property was made available
and he is well able, in the same medium, to oppose such views. In Red Lion the government asserted
the audience's entitlement not in order to force a private person to support speech with which he
disagreed, but to force the government's licensee to supply the licensed medium to views that a third
person was willing to utter, given that the licensee had made the medium available to contrary views.
See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 645-71 (1970); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 693-700 (1978); Schauer, Hudgens v. NLRB and the Problem of
State Action in First Amendment Adjudication, 61 MINN. L. REV. 433 (1977).
55. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1974). If the government does subsidize speech, problems arise with respect to equal access to the
subsidy. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). See also Karst, Equality
as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 43-52 (1975).
56. To say that the government need not generate information does not mean that it is never
obliged to distribute information that it possesses. It is not inconsistent with the proposition that the
right to receive communication is conditioned on the existence of willing and able private speakers
that the public may be entitled to information in government files that is relevant to "public" purposes
and exercise of the suffrage. See BeVier, An Informed Public, An Informing Press: The Search for a
Constitutional Principle, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 482 (1980). Moreover, if the government has been given
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Certainly, to the extent that the government impedes a speaker from
making a communication, it narrows the listener's opportunity to receive
it and the community's opportunity for "the discovery and spread of polit-
ical truth."" Accordingly, although the Supreme Court appears to be less
than committed to this view,"8 under the First Amendment courts must
test the validity of an impediment to expression by its consequences to
listeners and to the public as well as to the speaker. But it does not follow
that the public is entitled to the exchange of information, or that listeners
can compel its distribution to them, if speakers do not wish, or are eco-
nomically or organizationally unable, to make such communications. In
short, contrary to Justice Powell's implication, 9 the interests of the lis-
tener and the public in the exchange or circulation of views are cumula-
tive upon, but not independent of, a speaker's ability and desire to speak.60
Moreover, the government is not obliged to make all organizations
whose form it authorizes or whose existence it licenses able to utter com-
munications that some of the organization's members oppose or that are
on matters beyond the organization's charter powers. A's right to receive
information does not require the state to permit B to steal from C the
funds that alone will enable B to make the communication. For the state
to condition the association of B and C in a commercial venture upon
their joint consent to every act of joint communication that constitutes
waste is no more significant a curtailment of A's right to receive such
communication. If the state's laws prohibiting violation of the participants'
agreement concerning what the collective can say or their rules determin-
ing how the collective shall decide to speak can thus legitimately restrict
information, the audience may, in some circumstances, have a right to receive it in spite of the sup-
plier's desire not to have it disclosed. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980) (proceedings in courtroom); Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1, 14.
57. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
58. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
59. See note 28 supra.
60. Justice Blackmun initiated his discussion of listeners' rights under the First Amendment in
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), with
the observation that "[flreedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker." Id. at 756. See Baker,
Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976); Baker,
Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964, 1006-07 (1978). While
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965), involving a foreign speaker, suggests that the recip-
ient's entitlement is not dependent upon the speaker's "right" to speak, the recipient's "right" only
matured because there existed a speaker willing and able (apart from government prohibition) to
speak. Cf Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974) (improper censorship violates First
Amendment rights of recipients of inmates' letters); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971) (suggesting public interest in disclosure may excuse Times for disclosing information ille-
gally obtained even if it does not excuse Times for illegally acquiring that information); Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, (1943) (ban on door-to-door distribution of literature violates speech
rights of distributor and potential receivers). See also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829 (1978); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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the act of joint expression, nothing in the right to be informed invalidates
those restrictions. By the same token, the public interest in any such in-
terchange and in the fruits that such interchange may produce rises no
higher than the corporate power, under the terms of the corporation's
charter, to utter the information."'
If that analysis permits the state thus to forbid the president from caus-
ing the corporation to make wasteful expenditures equally whether the
waste is communication or other behavior, what justification did the Court
urge for striking down the Massachusetts statute in Bellotti? At the heart
of the decision appears to be the Court's perception that the statute inter-
dicted "the corporation's" behavior rather than the behavior of the human
beings causing the corporation to act." But to reify the corporation, to
accept the notion that the corporation is a person and that the First
Amendment protects "its" speech, does not end the matter. Rather, it
leaves to be solved the crucial questions of the state's power to decide who,
within the corporation, may authorize it to utter that speech," and
whether in light of the answer to that question, at least some corporate
utterances, even on purely political matters, are not "protected speech."
61. The Court's statement that "Consolidated Edison's position as a regulated monopoly does not
decrease the informative value of its opinions on critical public matters," Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.1 (1980), is thus insufficient to require Con Ed to utter
such opinions. Whether, because of the monopoly it grants to Con Ed, the state may condition that
company's communications to its captive audience on clearance with the Public Utilities Commission
raises a different question. The answer does not turn on the public's "entitlement" to that information
unless Con Ed, through its internal decisionmaking apparatus, wishes to communicate it.
62. Thus the Court emphasized that a long line of its decisions precludes the state from infringing
the "protected speech" of "corporate bodies," 435 U.S. at 778 n.14, and that its decisions preclude
legislatures from "dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who may
address a public issue," id. at 785. Indeed, the Court suggested that a significant defect in the statute
was that it would prohibit the corporation from speaking "even if its shareholders unanimously au-
thorized" the speech. Id. at 794. Compare Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 416
n.28 (1972) (suggesting that unanimous vote might legitimate union political expenditures) with
United States v. Lewis Food Co., 366 F.2d 710, 713-14 (9th Cir. 1966) (suggesting that ban on such
contributions violated even if unanimous stockholder consent obtained).
63. The courts and the bar have long recognized the divergence among the interests of the corpo-
rate "entity," its managers, its directors, and its stockholders, and the resultant need to fragment the
entity and identify its relevant components in order to determine whose "rights" are to be vindicated.
For example, the component to which corporate counsel owes loyalty has been the subject of volumi-
nous literature. See G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 50-53 (1978); Lorne, The Corpo-
rate and Securities Advisor, the Public Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L. REV. 425
(1978); Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals under the Federal Securities Laws-Some Obser-
vations, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 9 (1973); Taylor, The Role of Corporate Counsel, in CORPORATIONS
AT THE CROSSROADS, GOVERNANCE AND REFORM 217 (D. DeMott ed. 1980). A similar fracturing of
the "entity" is required to address the problem of corporate "standing" to vindicate "its" constitu-
tional rights as opposed to its members' rights. Cf Note, Associational Standing and Due Process:
The Need For an Adequate Representation Scrutiny, 61 B.U.L. REV. 174 (1981) (danger of inade-
quate representation of members in suits by associations). On a more prosaic level, the difference
between the entity and the stockholders bedevilled the courts in the Old Dominion cases. Compare
Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1907) with Old Domin-
ion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193 (1909), afl'd, 225 U.S.
111 (1912).
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The Court's suggestion in Bellotti that the absence of a provision per-
mitting unanimous stockholder approval to authorize the speech was a
fatal defect in the challenged statute is not unrelated to the received learn-
ing on corporate waste-that unanimous stockholder approval can cure
waste. Presumably, a state statute forbidding all wasteful corporate behav-
ior, including but not limited to the expenditures made in Bellotti, would
survive constitutional challenge if stockholder approval, even unanimous
approval, could avoid its prohibition. 64 The state's power to define the
terms on which parties enter into corporate arrangements surely includes
the power to prescribe when, and how much, stockholder approval is re-
quired in order to validate those corporate expenditures that the parties
originally agreed would otherwise be wasteful. The First Amendment
should not inhibit the non-discriminatory exercise of that state power
merely because the concededly wasteful behavior thus made curable takes
the form, inter alia, of communication. 6  Focusing, however, on a more
particularized problem-one addressed only to wasteful speech-raises a
different question.
B. Prohibitions on Only Wasteful Corporate Speech
To move from a law that interdicts all indisputably wasteful expendi-
tures of corporate funds to a statute that strikes only at indisputably
wasteful expenditures for speech raises the question whether such commu-
nication is "protected speech." Should the singling-out of wasteful non-
commercial speech, in contrast to other wasteful behavior by an errant
agent, trigger First Amendment restraints? A state could reasonably con-
clude that management's waste of corporate assets by such speech is
harder to detect or to police than other forms of waste, that expenditures
64. Justice Powell concedes that stockholders "generally have access to the judicial remedy of a
derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursements [including expenditures for 'debate on public is-
sues'] alleged to have been made for improper corporate purposes or merely to further the personal
interests of management." 435 U.S. at 794-95. Yet the Court also states that legislative prohibition of
such waste, sanctioned by criminal penalties, infringes the First Amendment. Id. at 785-86. Possibly
the Court's reifying the corporation and reading the statute to preclude the utterance of the corporate
message by anyone (even with unanimous stockholder approval) if the reified corporation was thus
forbidden from speaking caused the apparently contradictory statements. See note 109 infra. But to
recognize that the human beings who constitute the corporation can be consulted and can speak collec-
tively apart from the corporation precludes the conclusion that if it is forbidden from speaking, they
are also so forbidden.
65. Justice Powell's suggestion, however, that Justice White's dissent is in error because it implies
that "corporate activities [public service ads for charitable causes] that are widely viewed as educa-
tional and socially constructive could be prohibited," 435 U.S. at 782 n.18, strikes a bizarre note.
Certainly nothing in the Constitution prevents a state from forbidding a corporation to make charita-
ble contributions, that is, conditioning all sales of stock on a promise not to spend any funds for
charity having nothing to do with the corporate business. If the state does so, it is difficult to see why
the prohibition may not extend to expenditure of funds for ads praising the charity or urging contri-
butions to it.
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for such speech are more likely than other forms of expenditures to serve
only managerial interests (rather than mistaken estimates of collective in-
terests), and that such expenditures are less likely to produce returns to
the misappropriator that would enable the stockholders to recover from
him. The state might, therefore, seek to deter wasteful speech by a more
severe sanction than that applied to other forms of waste.6" Singling out
such impropriety for special treatment would be constitutional if, as this
reasoning suggests, the state has a "rational basis" for the special treat-
ment, and if, in addition, the proscription need not be tested by First
Amendment standards of substance or procedure.
A persuasive case can be made that the proscription need not be so
tested. But even if it must be so tested, there is good reason to believe it
would meet such a test. If the speech is concededly wasteful, the reasons
for using First Amendment standards to measure the constitutionality of
restrictions on speech do not apply. The restrictions are directed not at the
communicating function of speech-its particular content, subject matter,
or the receipt of its message by others-but at the creation of waste, which
happens to take the form of spending funds to communicate something
that is beyond the limited concerns of the corporate venture and in viola-
tion of the agreement of the corporate venturers. The communication is
not restricted in order to frustrate the sending of any message by the pres-
ident with his own funds or to prevent the receipt of a message by others.
It is restricted because the act of utterance is, by definition, an expropria-
tion of the collective assets of all the owners. It is an expropriation regard-
less of whether the words are gibberish or a coherent message. The con-
siderations that invoke the protection of the First Amendment should no
more inhibit the state from so defining expropriation, or from requiring
unanimous stockholder consent for such diversions of assets, than they
limit the state's power to prohibit communications that constitute fraud or
to prohibit the use of particular language in income tax returns, in appli-
cations for licenses to erect nuclear reactors, or in contracts that violate the
antitrust laws.67 Indeed, the First Amendment can hardly be more rele-
66. For example, the state might set a criminal penalty when other forms of waste are subject
only to civil liability or injunction.
67. See Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 372
(1979); cf Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (union members enjoined from
picketing ice distributor's business where purpose was to discourage sale of ice to nonunion retailers,
and actions constituted an unlawful restraint of trade). It does not alter this conclusion that when the
antitrust laws have been invoked against trade associations or groups seeking political action or judi-
cial or administrative decision their scope has been determined in light of First Amendment considera-
tions which are invokable by the individual violators of the antitrust laws. See UMW v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965); Eastern R.R. President's Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 137-40 (1961). But cf Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 379-80 (1973)
(litigation brought to maintain monopolistic position may not be constitutionally protected); California
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513-15 (1972) (First Amendment right to
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vant in the case of corporate waste, in which the communicative impact of
the message is quite immaterial, than it is in the latter cases, in which the
message conveyed is an integral part of the prohibited behavior.
To be sure, there is room to argue under the equal protection clause
whether the state can prohibit wasteful speech but not other forms of
waste, such as investment in a forbidden business, or whether it can pro-
hibit some modes of expropriation that depend upon speech, such as
fraud, by different criteria and sanctions than it uses to prohibit other
modes of expropriation, like embezzlement or robbery. But those argu-
ments turn on whether the government's choice has a rational basis. They
do not become disputes under the First Amendment merely because the
utterance of words is involved, whether the communication constitutes
fraud or waste.
That conclusion may not follow quite so inexorably from the premise of
"waste" if a prohibition is addressed only to particular kinds of wasteful
speech, and not to all kinds. For example, a law might prohibit ads for
products having no conceivable relation to the company without forbid-
ding similarly irrelevant political speech, or, as in Bellotti, might prohibit
some wasteful political speech but not all wasteful speech. Since the com-
munication is by definition "waste," and therefore not protected speech, it
may plausibly be argued that the taut First Amendment criteria of overin-
clusiveness and underinclusiveness must yield to the "rational basis" test
under the equal protection clause. 8 On the other hand, when the stricture
seems to be aimed at only a very narrow kind of political speech, and only
on a particular topic, a court may reasonably suspect that the concern of
the legislature is not "waste" but silencing the expression of particular
views. Such pinpointing may be sufficient to invoke the First Amendment
as the appropriate test of the propriety of the legislation. But a different
question is presented if the state seeks to interdict all wasteful political
speech made by "the" corporation without stockholder consent.
When all wasteful political or noncommercial speech is forbidden, the
scope of the statute fits the scope of the problem. It protects the rights of
the stockholder against a particular form of "waste" that is singled out not
petition does not necessarily immunize initiation of agency and judicial proceedings from antitrust
laws).
68. In contrast, the Court in Bellotti invoked First Amendment criteria to test the validity of the
Massachusetts statute, and required that the statute further a compelling state interest, be narrowly
drawn to infringe only that speech necessary to achieve the compelling state interest, and be drawn
broadly enough to reach all similar behavior. 435 U.S. at 786-95. To say that the legislation was
overinclusive in precluding corporate speech even with unanimous stockholder consent, and underin-
clusive in that it did not reach aggregations of capital other than corporations, raises conventional
"equal protection" questions. But the Court reviewed these issues with the kind of critical judicial
scrutiny that is traditionally reserved to measure unequal deprivations of First Amendment rights. See
Karst, supra note 55.
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for its communicative capacity, but because it is more difficult to detect
than other forms of waste, more likely to be used to implement manage-
ment's personal views, and less likely to create assets that stockholders can
recover from errant management. The scope of the special treatment of
such wasteful speech is thus no narrower and no broader than the evils
the government seeks, and is entitled, to prevent. Such a law does not,
therefore, raise a serious question whether its target is the communication
of ideas to other persons, or even the content of particular speech; thus,
the legislature is entitled to the presumption that its goal is the regulation
of a form of waste and not the suppression of messages.
If the First Amendment should require more exacting judicial scrutiny
of such legislation, because the legislation specifically regulates communi-
cation, albeit waste, the legislation can survive that scrutiny.69 But that
inquiry implicates a broader question-and a more significant justification
for the restriction.70
II. Intra Vires Speech: The Requirement of Stockholder Consent
At the outset it is worth emphasizing that, notwithstanding the varia-
tions permitted in corporate charters, the state normally determines the
process by which individual investors in the corporation may reach corpo-
rate decisions. For example, if an enterprise is incorporated to engage only
in the shoe business, the state can, and does, prescribe the terms on which
the participants may later agree to enable the firm to engage in an addi-
tional business, such as food processing, or to eliminate a part of the shoe
business, such as synthetic products or men's shoes. To that end, the state
may restrain, or permit the parties to restrain, management or each other
from using collective assets to communicate with stockholders concerning
69. The legislation would certainly satisfy the criteria of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968), and, if viewed as implementing the investors' contract, could also plausibly meet the more
demanding requirements that may be invoked when only speech is singled out for special restriction.
See note 68 supra.
70. The relationship of the stricture to the First Amendment would be closer if there were reason
to believe, in any particular instance, that the particular speech singled out for special restraint is not
waste. Possibly the Court believed that the speech the Massachusetts statute prohibited was "protected
speech" because it was not "waste" under corporate law, 435 U.S. at 784, and therefore should be
treated as "protected" because management could make such speech without violating the contract of
the participants. The Court did not dispute the finding of both the Massachusetts legislature and the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that the referendum in question did not materially affect the
corporation's business. First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass. 773, 785, 359 N.E.2d 1261,
1270 (1977), rev'd sub nom. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Possibly, the Court
believed that expenditure on a political question "other than one materially affecting any of the prop-
erty, business or assets of the corporation" covers more than merely "ultra vires" or "waste"; on that
premise the Court may have concluded that the state cannot by statute declare action to be "waste" or
ultra vires if the Court thinks it is not. Alternatively, the Court may have believed that the statute did
not make the particular expenditures equivalent to waste, and thus did not subject management to
liability to stockholders.
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changes in the charter arrangements. The First Amendment has little, if
any, effect on the state's authority to regulate such internal communica-
tions, whether they are made by management to stockholders or among
stockholders, so long as the communications address only the imple-
mentation or alteration of those internal arrangements." It is only when
corporate communications, even if made internally, as by management to
stockholders, are addressed to a broader subject matter than the imple-
mentation or alteration of the parties' contractual arrangements that the
First Amendment may become relevant. As we have seen, if that speech is
concededly beyond any power the participants have given the enterprise to
exercise, the state may prohibit it without offending the First Amendment.
Why should First Amendment considerations intrude when the state seeks
to restrict the internal decisionmaking process with respect to speech that
is within the power of the organization to make?
There is little reason for First Amendment criteria to test many forms
of government regulation that apply in a non-discriminatory manner to all
corporations, including those engaged in the business of communicating. "
71. Few ripples from the First Amendment affect state or federal law restraints on the use of
communications among stockholders to effect such legally permissible alterations in the enterprise.
The states have traditionally regulated-without reference to the First Amendment-stockholder ac-
cess to the means of communicating with other stockholders about corporate affairs. See State ex rel.
Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 191 N.W.2d 406 (1971). Similarly, for almost half a
century the federal government has-without any significant reference to the First Amend-
ment-regulated management's and stockholders' use of the proxy system to communicate with other
stockholders concerning corporate affairs. See SEC v. May, 134 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), af'd,
229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1956); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-8, -9 (1980) (Rules 14a-8 and 14a-9, pursuant to
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, imposing restrictions on stockholder proposals and general restraints
of proxy rules). See also Brown v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 328 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1964); Union
Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964); W. CARY & M. EISENBERG,
CORPORATIONS 288-89 (5th ed. 1980); Note, supra note 11, at 841-49.
To be sure, the Supreme Court has warned, in the labor union context, that under the First
Amendment "the gravest doubt" would arise from a prohibition against "publication, by corporations
and unions in the regular course of conducting their affairs, of periodicals advising their members,
stockholders or customers of danger or advantage to their interests from the adoption of measures, or
the election to office of men espousing such measures . . . ." United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 121
(1948); cf United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (union's right
to express views on political election essential to self-government). Possibly, therefore, speech by man-
agement to stockholders on matters that intersect both the mechanics of internal decisionmaking or
corporate business operations generally and public issues may stand on a different footing than does
the normal grist for the proxy mill, although the point appears never to have been seriously raised in
that context.
But this warning must be qualified on two grounds. The need to use the group's funds to communi-
cate with members of the enterprise about government action or public views that threaten its opera-
tions or prosperity need not invoke First Amendment considerations for corporations even if it may do
so for unions. See notes 89 & 206 infra. In any event, a line of later decisions, beginning with Rail-
way Employees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), see note 86 infra, teaches that exhortation of
investors, members, or other participants in a group enterprise to take political action to preserve the
enterprise or its prosperity may be entitled to the protection of the First Amendment, but that such
protection does not require or even-permit the government to compel investors or members to fund
such exhortation.
72. See, e.g., Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1946) (applica-
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But there may be good reason to invoke First Amendment standards to
test a generally applicable regulation that allocates internal corporate
decisionmaking among stockholders when applied to a communications
business. 73 It does not follow, however, that government should be equally
inhibited if the regulation governs only corporations not engaged in the
business of communicating. The First Amendment should not present an
insurmountable obstacle to such a regulation, whether it is (1) applied
equally to all activities, including the communication activities, of such
corporations, or (2) addressed only to political communications made by
such enterprises.
A. Stockholder Consent Requirements that Do Not Single Out Corpo-
rate Speech
Let us assume an enterprise not engaged in the communications busi-
ness, such as a cigarette manufacturer, and deal with a state's effort to
give its stockholders a larger voice over some business matters-sales to
minors, for example-than over others. Further assume that the state re-
quires management to obtain unanimous stockholder approval for any
contract for the sale of cigarettes that fails to prohibit resale to minors.
Assume that the state also requires similar stockholder approval for all
advertising campaigns intended or likely to induce purchases by minors,
but does not require such stockholder approval for any action, including
advertising, that is not likely to affect minors. Should the First Amend-
ment test the propriety of such regulation?
Since communication is not singled out for special treatment-both
sales and advertising are subject to the same requirement-it is hard to
see why such state-imposed restraints should not be free of the inhibitions
of the First Amendment. We are told that "[c]ommercial expression not
only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also' assists consumers
and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of
information."74 If we focus, for the moment, solely on the consumer's in-
terest in the utterance, and assume that we are dealing only with the com-
munication of an offer to sell that has no further implications by way of
tion of Fair Labor Standards Act to newspapers does not violate First Amendment); Associated Press
v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 130-33 (1937) (application of National Labor Relations Act to press does
not abridge freedom of speech or press).
73. If the regulated organization is specifically created to engage in the business of communicat-
ing, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), or is otherwise created for activities
which entail its members' First Amendment rights, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943), the First Amendment restricts the government's power to single out such an organization for
special disadvantage, or to impair its ability to perform its normal communicating functions. See note
89 infra.
74. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980).
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conditioning taste, urging political action, or otherwise, the communica-
tion is no more than a part of the effort to engage in the effectively forbid-
den transaction. 5 If thus viewed as only making an offer, the communica-
tion is either fraudulent, because it cannot be lawfully consummated, or
an inducement to join in the forbidden behavior, which no more raises a
problem under the First Amendment than does solicitation by a prostitute,
whether made face-to-face or in public print.7 6 If the thrust of the statute
is to forbid the sale of the commodity, the First Amendment does not pro-
tect the seller's ability to offer it or the consumer's entitlement to learn
about it by ads or other forms of communication, except to the extent that
such communications serve some function beyond informing the con-
sumer's choice of goods or services.
Viewing the problem from the perspective of the corporate seller does
not suggest a different conclusion. If the state entitles individual stock-
holders to a voice in deciding which conunodities the corporation may sell,
nothing in the First Amendment should qualify state power to give stock-
holders an equivalent voice in all aspects of the manufacture or sale of
those commodities, including their advertisement. Thus, for the state to
limit the discretion of the participants in a business venture to allocate
decisionmaking power should not raise a question under the First Amend-
ment, unless corporate speech is singled out for special treatment. To that
question we now turn.
B. Stockholder Consent Requirements that Single Out Corporate Politi-
cal Speech
We can best illustrate that question by eliminating from the example
the requirement of stockholder approval of both sales and ads, and substi-
tuting instead a statutory prohibition against sales of cigarettes to minors
and a statutory requirement of stockholder approval before any corporate
assets are used to oppose any legislation, including the prohibition on cig-
arette sales to minors. Corporate ads urging repeal of the legislation
would then squarely present the problem of corporate "political" speech.
As we have seen, even if the corporation itself is treated as a separate,
impenetrable persona having a right to be free from government restric-
tion on its speech, some rationale is necessary in order to invoke the First
75. A communication that does more than merely offer to sell requires further analysis. See pp.
281-86 infra.
76. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388
(1973). See also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6
(1980). The considerations that protect advocacy of illegal behavior as a necessary component of free-
dom of speech, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1118-94 (10th ed. 1980), do not apply equally in the context of seeking to
induce commercial transactions. See note 182 infra.
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Amendment to inhibit state efforts to prescribe a method of decisionmak-
ing by the individual participants in the corporate venture on matters of
interest to them when political speech is involved. The First Amendment
does not prohibit, or indeed affect, state statutory or common law author-
izing a contractual arrangement by the participants, voluntarily made part
of the corporate charter, that provides for their special consent for political
speech by the corporation." If instead the state conditions the banding
together of the investors in a corporate venture on adoption of a special
consensual procedure for expenditures of corporate funds on such speech,
is there any better case for invoking the First Amendment to test the pro-
priety of the condition?
1. The Legitimacy of the Government's Interests
If the state precludes private parties from contracting to delegate control
over political speech to management or to a mere majority of stockholders,
it undoubtedly restricts the freedom of speech of some stockholders, but
expands the freedom of speech of others.7" More particularly, if the state
precludes such arrangements, it offers greater freedom to the transient
members of the minority at the expense of the transient members of the
majority; to permit stockholders so to contract is to reverse that offer. In
either case, since the state itself is, and historically always has been, the
sole source of authority for such collective arrangements, the state is "act-
ing." Accordingly, any enforcement the state offers to, or restrictions it
places on, shareholders' contractual arrangements for collective political
speech by a business corporation denies to some individuals unrestricted
77. The state apparently may permit a private group to condition an individual's opportunity to
invest in the group's commercial venture on his advance consent to let management or even a majority
of the participants spend the venture's funds on political speech they believe to be in the firm's inter-
ests. Any such arrangement proposes a relinquishment of the individual participant's control over the
use of his funds for political expression. But the rules are not entirely clear. There is little doubt that
for the state to compel such relinquishment would violate the First Amendment. See Wooley v. May-
nard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state may not require individuals to disseminate ideological message dis-
played on automobile license plates); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); note 54 supra. Moreover, the union shop cases suggest that for the government to authorize
private imposition of such conditions for investment in commercial enterprise would, at least in those
circumstances, violate the First Amendment. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977);
Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972); Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v.
Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); pp.
268-69 infra. Whether or not the decisions imply a constitutional prohibition against corporate of-
ficers' use of the corporation's funds for political purposes, the activities of private parties that the
state permits are not without their restrictive effect on individual investors' exercise of rights of
speech.
78. A refusal to permit appropriation of contributed resources is a rational response to a difficult
allocation problem, similar to a government mandate designed to regulate the sharing of presumably
scarce resources for purveying information and to avoid conflict from uncontrolled access to such
resources. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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choice in the use of their invested funds for political speech. Thus, the
question whether the First Amendment prohibits the state from requiring
unanimous stockholder approval before corporate funds are used to oppose
legislation must be answered in light of the inevitability of some state-
imposed burdens on the freedom of speech of some investors.
Legitimate government interest in such a requirement is suggested by
the teaching of both (a) political science-a concern with the freedom of
speech and political voice of individual investors-and (b) economic the-
ory-a concern with the formation of capital.
(a)
A state could rationally conclude that freedom of speech is better pre-
served for individual investors if they are not obliged to give up some of
that freedom to management or to a majority of their fellow investors as a
condition of making an investment in a commercial enterprise that is not
engaged in the business of communicating. A state could also rationally
conclude that management is not entitled to use any discretion in such
matters." Finally, it could reason that a requirement of unanimous con-
sent does not improperly restrict either those investors who favor particu-
lar expression or society's interest in the dissemination of such speech, so
long as those majority stockholders whose views management might have
faithfully reflected are free to band together, in a structure parallel to the
business venture, to express themselves on the same subject and in the
same way as the "entity" might have done.
State efforts to safeguard the First Amendment interests of sharehold-
ers, both majority and minority, may appropriately rest on the need to
limit management's power to use corporate funds for noncommercial
speech. Management's use of corporate assets to express its political pref-
erences, social views, or opinions need bear little correlation with the po-
litical or social views of stockholders. Both in theory8 and in practice,8
79. Whether or not most managements support the same government activities or have the same
views on social matters, see note 12 supra, it is not unreasonable for government to conclude that
management should not have access to stockholders' assets to urge its views on society, no matter how
plausibly essential management thinks those views are to corporate prosperity. To be sure, in an age
of the welfare state and extensive government regulation of business, the entitlement of the collectivity
to resist the regulation of its business operations may raise equal protection or due process questions.
See generally C. LINDBLOM, supra note 12, at 170-200; note 96 infra.
80. The typical state corporation statute provides (and possibly requires) that stockholders dele-
gate to management decisionmaking power over expenditure of funds to advance or protect corporate
operations. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 35 (Supp. 1977).
81. The possibility of displacement by stockholders is hardly likely to be a constraint on manage-
ment's expenditures for speech on political matters or other matters of opinion, especially in light of
management's control of the proxy system. Nor is disagreement over the spending of corporate funds
on political or social speech apt to produce displacement by take-over. See Note, supra note 11, at
849. It is understandable when corporate counsel urges the notion that the internal processes of corpo-
rate democracy or the availability of derivative suits under present law is adequate to permit stock-
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management is substantially free to use corporate assets to urge any politi-
cal or social views it sees fit, so long as it can establish a plausible connec-
tion between those expenditures and a long term commercial benefit to the
corporation. Given the looseness that is sufficient to establish the necessary
connection,82 few managements are likely to fail to make it.
Even if the realities of corporate suffrage and control are ignored, and it
is assumed that the problem is protecting the rights of majorities within
the corporation to speak politically through responsive management, this
problem is more acute for investors in large publicly held business corpo-
rations than for participants in most other kinds of group activities. The
process of funneling individual stockholders' political or social opinions
through the business corporation distorts the representation of their views
in a manner at odds with the premises of the political system. Voting in
large publicly held corporations is by the share, not by the person; hence,
the political power of individuals with large blocks of stock is magnified to
the extent that they can control, for political purposes, the use of the assets
of minority stockholders that are held in corporate solution. 3 Although
the First Amendment may not require government to preclude the dis-
torting effect of management or majority use of corporate assets for politi-
cal purposes, it is difficult to find in it anything that precludes a state
from attempting to prevent such distortion.
To acknowledge that requiring consent from more than a majority of
the stockholders impedes "the corporation's" speech and the public's op-
portunity to hear it does not alter this conclusion. Any arrangement re-
quiring prior consultation with stockholders before corporate exercise of
holder voices to dictate or alter, or even to affect, management's political spending of corporate funds,
see Schaefer, The First Amendment, Media Conglomerates and "Business" Corporations: Can Cor-
porations Safely Involve Themselves in the Political Process? 55 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 1, 8 n.37 (1980),
but it comes as something of a surprise when a Supreme Court Justice judicially notices it, see First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95 (1978) (Powell, J.), especially one whose professional
life embraced service of corporate clients. Cf Powell Memorandum, supra note 35 (memorandum to
U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
82. The so-called business judgment rule is a virtual immunizer of such managerial judgments.
See Brudney, supra note 6, at 614-15. Ironically, the movement for corporate social responsibility has
considerably broadened the scope of acceptable managerial discretion.
83. That point is particularly relevant in determining the appropriate mode of generating a pool
of funds for use in political matters. In the political process, individuals' political preferences are
normally given equal weight; votes are not measured by wealth per person. Thus, a system of major-
ity rule by vote of shares is somewhat incongruous as a basis for allocating collective funds in political
matters. The institutional ownership of stock further complicates the issue; so does the resulting ques-
tion of the proper relationship to the political process of the holders of institutions' stock (mutual
funds) or of the institutions' beneficiaries or trustees in the case of, for example, ownership by
churches, universities, or pension funds. See SEC REPORT, supra note 21, at 379-421. The possibility
that voting power tied to share ownership might cause an undue concentration of political power was
an early source of concern in several states. See Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations:
Critical Reflections on the Rule of "One Share, One Vote", 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1970) (early
legislation in some states provided for voting by shareholders rather than by shares).
Vol. 91: 235, 1981
Corporate Free Speech
the power to speak, such as prohibiting delegation to agents, also impedes
"the corporation" from speaking. Yet it does not follow that the First
Amendment requires the state to permit owners to delegate such powers
to managers who have no obligation even to consult stockholders.84 Nor
does the possibility that the requirement to consult stockholders impedes
the corporation's speech to a degree that would be constitutionally intoler-
able if imposed on individual speech make the impediment offensive to the
First Amendment. Group action-whether in the form of speech or other-
wise-is legitimately and traditionally subject to greater regulation by
government than is individual action. It is the impact of government regu-
lation on the ability of the individual members of the group to act collec-
tively in order to implement or protect their individual First Amendment
interests that should determine the validity of such laws.
It has been suggested that because individuals' rights of expression enti-
tle them to amplify their views by collective expression, a requirement of
unanimous consent would run afoul of the First Amendment. The notion
appears to be that the First Amendment requires government to permit
simple "majority rule" within a group when the group's funds are used
for political speech."5 There is little basis in law 6 or logic for that notion,
84. But cf Bolton, supra note 3, at 413 (suggesting need to delegate making of political judgments
within corporation).
85. See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 596-97 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 143-49 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring). See also First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,
772-73 (1961). But see Bolton, supra note 3, at 400 (noting apparent contradiction between this view
and rationale of Street and Hanson).
One theory is that a rule that allows a majority to use only its own funds and relieves the minority
of the obligation to contribute to effectuation of the group's collective bargaining purposes creates a
free rider problem that disadvantages the majority. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE AC-
TION 66-97 (1971); Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 148, 155 (1974). But the theory of
the First Amendment right of association does not preclude such a disadvantage. Indeed, that disad-
vantage inheres in democratic voting systems. In theory, the free rider cost to the majority is trivial
compared to the cost of forcing the minority to speak against its will. On a practical level, pressures of
group membership may dilute free rider costs. Not only is there peer pressure, and in the case of
unions possibly covert coercion, but the members of the union may not view the enterprise solely in
economic terms. Union members may reap the same kind of altruistic returns general contributors
receive from donations to political campaigns.
86. The Railway Labor Act and perhaps also the Taft-Hartley Act authorize exclusive bargain-
ing-union shop arrangements. See Comment, The Regulation of Union Political Activity: Majority
and Minority Rights and Remedies, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 386, 416-20 (1977). These Acts were once
thought to permit the union leadership to use union funds for political activities in the interest of the
membership. Indeed, such use was thought to be a constitutional entitlement derived from the notion
of majority rule within the union. See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 596-97 (1957) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 143-49 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring); cf
DeMille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333
U.S. 876 (1948) (union may use dues to oppose legislation if union constitution states that such action
is one purpose of union). But the Court has more recently opined, although it has not squarely held,
that the nexus between the union arrangements that the Railway Labor Act and some state statutes
permit and government "action" is apparently close enough to subject union leaders acting under
those arrangements to the restrictions of the First Amendment. Thus, the First Amendment rights of
259
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except when a simple majoritarian rule is necessary for the functioning of
a group formed for the purpose of engaging in speech or vindicating other
rights the First Amendment protects. 7 Perhaps all groups would be enti-
tled to such "majority rule" if associative rights derived only from the
First Amendment." ' But more plausibly, as the Court has suggested, it is
only those associative rights that are exercised to implement or amplify
other First Amendment rights, such as freedom of speech and of the press,
that the First Amendment should protect against government regulation of
the association's external behavior or internal decisionmaking. 9
individual union members are violated when union leaders spend union funds to espouse political
views that some members oppose, even though the espousal is on behalf of the members' collective
interest. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v.
Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Rail-
way Employees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). See also Beck v. CWA, 468 F. Supp. 93 (D.
Md. 1979).
87. At common law, majority rule became an assumed feature of the contract among members of
a corporation. R. STEVENS, supra note 40, at 565 n.1. Deviation from such a rule was contemplated,
however. States, by legislation, could alter that rule, and stockholders were permitted to contract for a
unanimity requirement. In fact, for matters not functionally related to day-to-day decisonmaking, a
rule of unanimity was operationally tolerable, and actually prevailed. See note 40 supra.
A group formed for the purpose of engaging in speech presumably will engage in speech frequently,
if not daily. To require even simple majority, let alone supermajority, consent before each such utter-
ance would virtually preclude the group from fulfilling its purpose. Thus, regulating the internal
decisionmaking of such groups to require frequent consultation with membership poses a substantial
First Amendment problem. See L. TRIBE, supra note 54, at 704; cf Democratic Party v. LaFollette,
101 S. Ct. 1010, 1018-20 (1981) (government interference with seating of delegates to national party
convention violates First Amendment rights of party members); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477,
489-91 (1975) (state regulation of national party delegate selection unconstitutionally impairs nomina-
tion process); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) (statute prohibiting voters from voting in a
party's political primary if they have voted in a different party's primary within 23 months violates
voters' rights of free political association); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (state university's
refusal to grant student political group privileges afforded other student organizations violates stu-
dents' free speech and associational rights).
88. See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964,
1029-31 (1978).
89. The First Amendment's prohibition against laws abridging the "right of the people peaceably
to assemble" is offered in the context of protecting freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and access
to government. See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley,
102 S. Ct. 434, 437-39 (1981). That provision offers protection to the activities of associations, like the
NAACP, that are formed and function primarily to vindicate members' First Amendment rights.
Indeed, it may be that purpose of such organizations that underpins First Amendment protection for
their associational activities. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1963); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459-60 (1958), L. TRIBE,
supra note 54, at 700-08.
If, in an enterprise formed primarily to implement members' First Amendment rights, the govern-
ment is permitted to hamper the majority's effectiveness by a requirement of unanimous consent
designed to protect the minority, then the government can effectively cripple all efforts at amplification
of individuals' First Amendment rights of expression by collective action. Not only may government
thus effectively silence the first association, but it could prevent the majority of that group from form-
ing another such enterprise for the purpose of collectively engaging in speech, since the new enterprise
would be exposed to the same peril. But no such silencing effect occurs if the government's power to
protect the minority by a requirement of unanimous consent is confined to enterprises not formed for
the purpose of implementing their members' First Amendment freedoms. In such a case, the ability to
form another association for the purpose of amplifying members' First Amendment rights is available
as a safety valve.
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The considerations supporting First Amendment protection for the in-
ternal decisionmaking of such associations do not apply equally to a pub-
licly held noncommunications business venture" when it seeks to make
political utterances." Such an enterprise is not formed to amplify its in-
vestors' First Amendment rights. Nor does it have the personal autonomy
that enables individuals to exercise noneconomic preferences," and for
which the First Amendment seeks to assure fulfillment in self-expression.
On the contrary, it is the corporation's stockholders whose right to speak
and refrain from speaking is at issue. Nothing in the First Amendment
compels the state, in order to give the most appropriate protection to the
individual's freedom of expression, to choose between permitting share-
holders in such a venture to delegate to a majority or to management the
authority to use collective funds for political speech or requiring unani-
90. The argument for simple majority rule presumably rests on the assumptions that majority
coalitions of autonomous individuals are easily formed in a free society, that majority coalitions are
not permanent but are pliable, and that such coalitions are able to form and reform in order to replace
leadership that fails to implement the majority's aspirations. Whether or not that model correctly
reflects majority rule in trade unions or other groups that conform to the principle of "one man, one
vote," it bears little resemblance to publicly held corporations, where voting is by shares. See Manne,
Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427 (1964). Management's control
of the proxy system further discourages use of the model of majority rule to describe those corporate
decisions on which stockholders are consulted. In addition, the percentage of the voting constituency
that participates in the voting is apt to be smaller in public corporations than in other groups like
unions or trade associations from which exit is more costly, and in which collective decisions tend to
have greater immediate impact on individual members.
91. In the case of a corporation not engaged in the business of communicating, a government
requirement of supermajority consent for political speech would not interfere with the corporation's
daily operations. Nor would it unduly restrict individuals' right to speak, since that right is collateral
to the purpose of the corporation, compare Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)
(state bar disciplinary action against attorney for soliciting business held constitutional) with In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (state bar disciplinary action against ACLU lawyer for soliciting busi-
ness violates First Amendment), and may be exercised collectively by forming a new association for
that purpose.
92. The range of preferences open to business corporations as economic instruments is much nar-
rower than that open to individuals. The latter plainly may prefer noneconomic goals over economic
objectives, but the former are presumably confined to maximizing investor wealth. Business corpora-
tions have no legitimate role in vindicating-or intruding into-the noneconomic interests of their
individual investors by political action. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 805-06 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting); FEC v. Weinsten, 462 F. Supp. 243, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); O'Kelley, supra
note 30, at 1349-51. The notions of pluralism and of the essential role groups play in a democratic
polity, see D. TRUMAN, GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1971), even if they otherwise illuminate the scope
of the First Amendment, see Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech? 85 YALE L.J.
1000, 1013-17 (1976), do not require homogenization of all groups, so that business corporations and
the American Civil Liberties Union or Common Cause become equivalent "groups" through which
participants exercise political rights and free speech. But cf E. EPSTEIN, THE CORPORATION IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 221-30 (1969) (corporations are merely one of several social interest groups that
possess equivalent political assets); Bolton, supra note 3, at 414-16 ("irrational" to limit corporate
political activity and not that of other interest groups.)
Unquestionably, it is difficult to delineate groups formed for the purpose, "primary" purpose, or
central objective of amplifying individual members' First Amendment interests, and to separate them
from enterprises with substantial, if not quite central, interests in such purposes. But those difficulties
are not serious obstacles to placing publicly held business corporations well on one side of the line-as
long as the business corporation is not a hybrid. See pp. 290-91 infra.
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mous stockholder consent for such speech.93 But it does not self-evidently
forbid the state from imposing a requirement that is designed to assure
maximum individual choice in the matter, without precluding either col-
lective action outside the corporate structure or individual contributions to
enable the particular speech to be made. Indeed, since a state's failure to
require stockholder consent will leave individuals subject to the condition
that in order to make investments they must relinquish full control of
their resources for making political speech, it is hard to see how the First
Amendment (or its mode of testing the constitutionality of restrictions on
speech) can answer the problem. Nonetheless, its message points to the
permissibility of the state's choice to require stockholder consent.94
No less important may be the government's interest in expanding the
political power of individuals and limiting that of business corporations by
unbundling the latter's political activities from their economic function. 5
The government may seek to limit business corporations' political activity
in order to confine them to their economic roles.96 Whatever may be the
"right" of a business corporation organized for profit-making purposes to
93. But cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) (union political speech
must be financed through voluntary employee contributions); Brotherhod of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v.
Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 118-19 (1963) (dues of union members who object to union political activity
cannot be used for such activity); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961)
(same); pp. 268-69 infra (discussing union cases).
94. As the Court has pointed out:
Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not
afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitu-
tionally guaranteed freedom. . . . Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but
freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not.
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). See Lorain Journal v. United States, 342
U.S. 143 (1951); cf Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company-owned town must allow
freedom of speech). On that logic, nothing in the First Amendment should deny government the
power to intervene to protect an individual stockholder from being forced to couple his investment
with permission for managers to use corporate assets for political speech that he opposes. It cannot
plausibly be argued that the First Amendment forbids one state from prohibiting what it forbids
another state from permitting. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 814-15 (1978) (White,
J., dissenting). Compare Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (shopping center owner can
deny free speech to persons seeking access to shopping center for that purpose) with Pruncyard Shop-
ping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (within constitutional power of state to require such
access).
95. Cf Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512-13 (1959) (notion of "tax equilibrium"
said to justify denial of tax deduction on ordinary and necessary business expenses for indirect politi-
cal expenditures to eliminate political advantage for business not available to citizens concerned with
political action unrelated to their business); Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d
437, 448 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (Davis, J., dissenting) (deductibility of expenses related to appearance of
company officers before congressional committees gives business unfair tax advantage); IRS Hearings,
supra note 10, at 47-53, 182-83, 195-99 (non-enforcement of non-deductibilty of indirect political
expenditures violates "tax equilibrium" concept); Lambert, supra note 2, at 1069 n.142 ("tax equilib-
rium" may require that both individual and corporate taxpayers be allowed to deduct their indirect
political expenditures). But cf Cooper, The Tax Treatment of Business Grassroots Lobbying: Defin-
ing and Attaining the Public Policy Objectives, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 810-16 (1968) (challenging
notion of "tax equilibrium").
96. See note 92 supra.
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support political action to protect its "property," First Amendment con-
siderations need not preclude government efforts to separate the corpora-
tion's power to affect political choices from its power to exercise economic
preferences.97 In order to enhance individual investors' participation in
such political choices,9" that effort can rationally take the form of requir-
ing individual stockholder consent for such corporate action. To prohibit a
systematic requirement that investors make joint choices in political and
economic matters frees them to make separate personal choices in each,
but does not preclude them from making collective decisions in either.
To be sure, the transient members of the "majority" are thereby denied
the "full" political effectiveness that their speech might have if they or
"their" management could use the corporate treasury to fund their utter-
ances. But alternative modes of collectively funding political messages are
available, although they impinge, in varying degrees, on the effectiveness
of the use of the funds to further the majority's speech." Where, if any-
where, along the spectrum of possibilities for such collective speech with-
out use of the minority's funds a constitutional line must be drawn, may
be left for later analysis. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that in
97. If the large business corporation is viewed simply as a profit-maximizing enterprise in a free
market economy, there is a puzzling circularity in empowering it to use political action to define the
rules of "profit maximizing" and to determine its own claims on social resources-for example, who
bears the costs of the externalities it creates-as against individual claimants on those resources. To be
sure, permitting the firm to make political expenditures does not vest in it full power to make such
determinations. But if solution of the circularity problem requires restrictions on such power, society
could reasonably conclude that permitting firms to make political expenditures goes too far down the
road to such power. If large corporate firms are recognized as long-term economic decisionmakers for
the entire society, albeit subject to profit constraints, there is an equally difficult problem in legitimat-
ing their entitlement to the power to prevent the imposition of social constraints on their economic
behavior. See Reich, supra note 12. Again, society could reasonably conclude that allowing authority
in firms to make political expenditures travels too far down the road to such power.
That the First Amendment generally protects individuals' speech in business matters, but cf Baker,
Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976) (First Amend-
ment does not protect commercial speech because such speech fails to further speaker's liberty), does
not mean that it similarly protects the speech of large publicly owned business corporations. The
individual investors retain their individual entitlements under the First Amendment and may still
organize to speak collectively on behalf of the same objectives, but in a vehicle other than the
corporation.
98. See Patton & Bartlett, Corporate "Persons" and Freedom of Speech: The Political Impact of
Legal Mythology, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 494.
99. If unanimous consent to a particular corporate message cannot be obtained, remitting stock-
holders to individual speech on behalf of the business corporation will make such messages more
difficult to utter. But the difficulty is lessened if the state requires that stockholders be given access to
mailing lists and permits them, at their own expense, to solicit funds for particular messages. It is
lessened further if the state allows management to use corporate facilities and assets to solicit funds for
particular messages. It is lessened even further if those funds can be collected annually in advance for
those political messages that management thinks will further corporate ends during the next year.
Under such a plan, the obstacle to the utterance being made is no greater than if management were
permitted to spend corporate funds on such messages but had to remit to claiming stockholders their
pro rata share of those funds. See pp. 271-73 infra; cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,
240-42, 240 n.41 (1977) (dissenters to receive refund of their pro rata share of union's political
expenditures).
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the interest of preserving the freedom of the individual investor to avoid
contributing to speech he opposes, mechanisms exist that enable the state
to curtail the power of individual investors to become a majority that can
use a minority's funds for political speech, but still allow the majority to
speak collectively, through Political Action Committees (PACs) or other-
wise, outside the corporate structure."'
(b)
Economic theory, as well as political science, suggests a legitimate gov-
ernment interest in requiring stockholder consent for corporate political
action. Allowing capital to be raised on the condition that its contributors
permit management to use it for political purposes, without providing
them a meaningful choice as to the particular political or noncommercial
use, may increase the cost of capital. Most corporate decisions, particu-
larly those affecting the profitability of normal business dealings in free
markets, can only be effectively made and implemented if stockholders
delegate to management decisonmaking power over the use of contributed
funds. But when corporate power is to be exercised to affect governmental
action, there is more reason to require express stockholder approval. In
the first place, it is easier to seek advance stockholder consent for such
action, which is not a matter of daily routine. In the second place, when
the corporation uses funds to influence government action, the individual
participant has given up more than simply control over the use of his
contributed assets in effecting volitional market exchanges. To permit cor-
porate funds to be used to influence the exercise of government power
forces a person seeking profits from market transactions, for which he
must delegate decisionmaking power, to relinquish power to determine the
extent and character of governmental compulsion on himself and the rest
of society. It fractures his power to influence government decisions, on a
range of issues-such as environmental or health and safety regulations,
taxation, race relations, or the conduct of the nation's foreign affairs-that
affect his welfare and that he may oppose. It also requires him to permit
the use of his assets to support social views and generate social attitudes
that may impinge upon his individual preferences.
"Bundling" such decisionmaking power-requiring investors to contrib-
ute to joint activity XY, rather than permitting them to contribute to X
activity and Y activity separately-is inefficient by conventional economic
100. It has been suggested that, for many kinds of messages, only the corporation is able to gener-
ate and produce the necessary information. See Prentice, Consolidated Edison and Bellotti: First
Amendment Protection of Corporate Political Speech, 16 TULSA L. REV. 599, 636 (1981). Even if this
were true, nothing would prevent the stockholders from organizing to acquire the information from
the corporation and disseminating it at their own expense.
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analysis, unless the transaction costs of raising capital for Y exceed the
increase in the cost of capital that results from the loss of potential con-
tributors who choose not to contribute to XY because they wish to con-
tribute to X activity or contingency but not to Y.' The transaction costs
will undoubtedly exceed the savings from unbundling if every commercial
or business operating decision is unbundled from the others and referred
to the investors for individual choice. But such costs may well be less than
the savings if only matters of political speech and social opinion -are un-
bundled."0 2 Whether they will in fact be less depends upon how much
more investors will seek to charge for their contributions if they perceive
that their ability to affect the political or social consequences they favor is
diminished by the fact that they must make joint contributions to XY
rather than separate individual contributions. To require the state to al-
low only contributions to XY discourages certain contributors from invest-
ing in certain X's because of the compelled linkage with Y, and thus re-
quires the state to raise the cost of capital. Since in many cases the savings
may not be so clear as to make unbundling wise, the state need not re-
quire "unbundling." But its decision to do so may be a rational response
to economic considerations, as well as an effort to enhance individual in-
vestors' power to make political choices.103
2. The Proper First Amendment Balance
If in authorizing the formation and operation of business corporations
the government must choose between preserving the First Amendment in-
101. Given a choice between contributing to X (for example, a "for-profit" shoe manufacturing
venture) and/or contributing to Y (for example, a venture organized to express views on government
regulation of shoe imports, durability standards, and health standards), and contributing to XY (a
single venture combining both efforts), some investors could rationally choose not to contribute to XY.
Those persons would include at least those who believe that Y's activities, even if in support of X, can
also produce government action that offends their personal preferences. They also would include those
investors who believe the transaction costs of raising the funds for Y activity to be less than the savings
in the cost of capital that result from separating contributions to X and Y.
102. It does not materially alter the result that there will also be costs of identifying, and possibly
debating, the matters to be unbundled.
103. The legislative decision may distinguish between political speech and speech addressed more
broadly to matters of social policy that are not likely to become, or at least are not imminent, subjects
of political action. The former may be defined as speech seeking to affect the exercise of the coercive
power of the state on the individual investor-as by election of certain candidates or adoption of
certain legislation-through action with respect to which the individual investor is given a voice by
voting. The latter has fewer coercive implications for the individual, although it does affect social
behavior that may produce constraints or pressure on individual behavior.
A legislature could rationally conclude that the individual investor should be protected against man-
agerial or majoritarian corporate decisionmaking in matters that will produce government coercion but
not in matters that have less coercive impact on him. The First Amendment may well prohibit such a
distinction when the legislature seeks to restrict the individual's freedom of expression. But it need not
preclude a legislature from making that distinction when the legislature seeks to enhance the individ-
ual investor's freedom of expression. See p. 276 infra.
The Yale Law Journal
terests of individuals who from time to time constitute a minority of their
stockholders and the similar interests of an equally transient majority of
stockholders, how is the validity of its choice to be tested? Because legisla-
tion requiring stockholder consent for corporate political speech expands
individuals' freedom to speak individually without precluding their free-
dom to band together to speak collectively, less exacting judicial scrutiny
than the First Amendment otherwise requires may be appropriate in as-
sessing the constitutional validity of such legislation.' 4 But to the extent
that exacting scrutiny of the legislation is required to determine whether it
is sufficiently narrowly drawn and whether it serves a sufficiently compel-
ling government interest, nothing in the received learning makes such leg-
islation invalid; and the teaching of cases involving union shop agree-
ments01 suggests that it is valid.
Adumbrations from Buckley v. Valeot°t do not overshadow the legisla-
tion under discussion. The legislation does not prescribe a ceiling on the
amount anyone can spend on speech, since each individual participant is
free, acting alone or through a group formed for that end, to give as much
as he chooses for political speech on behalf of the corporation or its pur-
poses. Nor does it rest on the notion that the greater wealth and therefore
the greater speech-making power of some individuals must be curbed in
the interest of equalizing the relative ability or power of the voices of each
individual in the political arena." 7 It does deprive management of discre-
tion, and transient majorities of control, over the funds of transient minor-
ities. But it makes no systematic effort to restrain the speech of one identi-
fiable class-like the wealthy in Buckley v. Valeo-more than that of
another identifiable class of people, in order to equalize their voices.
Bellotti also does not address the questions here raised. That decision
rests in part on the suspiciously narrow thrust of the statute' 8 and in part
104. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Court did not require narrowest of strictures to
achieve government purposes); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102-03 (1973) (judicial
deference to congressional evaluation of competing First Amendment claims for broadcast media ac-
cess). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1973); Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist.,
411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); L. TRIBE, supra note 54, at 1082-89; Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forwvard: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Mlodel For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17-48 (1972). While the notion of
deference to the legislative judgment has little place in the context of challenges to majoritarian re-
strictions on individuals' speech, efforts to protect individuals' interest in group utterances by requir-
ing consultation with group members pose a somewhat different question for the Court. But cf Karst,
supra note 55, at 43-52 (presence of competing First Amendment claims in media access cases does
not alter courts' obligation to assess interests).
105. E.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks
v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961);
Railway Employees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
106. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
107. See id. at 48-49.
108. See note 35 supra.
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on the assumption that a flat prohibition of corporate political speech pre-
cludes anyone from uttering the proposed message on behalf of the corpo-
ration or its stockholders.' 9 The opinion scants the issues of the individual
stockholders' freedom of expression and the availability of alternative
stockholder-financed sources for the message; it also fails to address the
question of what substitute for the managerial discretion that today's cor-
porate laws allow would be constitutionally adequate to offset the impedi-
ment to corporate speech that a requirement of unanimous stockholder
consent would create.
Similarly, neither the holdings nor the rationales of Consolidated
Edison v. Public Service Commission"' and Central Hudson Gas & Elec-
tric v. Public Service Commission" preclude a requirement of stockholder
consent for corporate political speech. The former case struck down an
order of the New York State Public Service Commission prohibiting util-
ity companies from including in their billing envelopes literature favoring
the development of nuclear energy. The latter struck down an order by
the Commission that sought to conserve energy by prohibiting utilities
from engaging in promotional advertising. Neither case involved a claim
of stockholders' rights under the First Amendment. In each case, the regu-
lation was designed to protect the consumers and the public by denying
them access to the content of the speech the utility was willing to make
rather than to protect the rights of the stockholders to be free from com-
pulsion to finance views they oppose."
2
If the most immediately relevant cases do not preclude a requirement of
unanimous stockholder consent, the teaching of other cases suggests that
such a requirement can appropriately meet a compelling state need. The
process for assigning weight to particular state interests in determining
whether they are sufficiently compelling to offset particular impediments
to speech is somewhat difficult to discern. How the Court balances the
value of the protected interest and the burden the restriction imposes on
First Amendment values remains a mystery comprehensible only to judi-
109. The opinion speaks of state action that "silence[s]" the speech or "suppress[es]" the message,
so that it presumably cannot be offered to the world. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777
& n.12 (1978).
110. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
111. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
112. The Court's suggestion that the burden of supporting the utility's speech could be placed on
stockholders, Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 568 n.11
(1980), does not mean that the First Amendment requires the state expressly to do so or requires that
shareholders bear the burden. Moreover, since the Court viewed the promotional literature in Central
Hudson as "commercial" speech, id. at 566-68, it may have given less weight to stockholders' First
Amendment rights than is appropriate when noncommercial speech is involved. In any event, in the
Central Hudson case, as in Bellotti, the Court equated the state's action with the "complete suppres-
sion of speech." Id. at 569-71.
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cial initiates.'" The same may be said for determining overinclusiveness
or underinclusiveness under First Amendment criteria. But if we were to
test a state requirement of unanimous stockholder approval by the usual
criteria prescribed for testing restrictions on communication that are not
directed at a particular message but that incidentally affect the process of
communicating-whether the restrictions further a sufficiently "compel-
ling state interest," are sufficiently "narrowly drawn," and are the "least
restrictive" of the available alternatives-it would pass that test, at least as
developed in decisions of cognate questions involving labor unions.
The necessary compelling state interest is to be found at least in the
need to protect individual stockholders against being forced to choose be-
tween contributing to political or social expressions with which they disa-
gree or foregoing opportunities for profitable investment." 4 The Court's
cases upholding the rights of union members not to contribute to political
speech made by the union suggest that this interest justifies the balance of
competing First Amendment rights of stockholders that the proposed legis-
lation strikes."' In those cases, the Court required unions that were statu-
torily authorized to negotiate union shop agreements (or to require work-
ers who did not wish to join the union to make payments equivalent to
dues) to offer some appropriate form of rebate to those workers who did
not desire their contributions to be spent on efforts to achieve political
results that they did not favor.
The sacrifice of the employee's First Amendment freedom of association
under the statutory union shop and exclusive bargaining provisions up-
113. Compare Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (interest in assuring lawyers' professional
conduct not sufficiently compelling tojustify ban on advertising) with Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. I
(1979) (interest in non-deceptive trade name use sufficiently compelling to justify prohibition on prac-
ticing optometry under trade name) and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (inter-
est in proper conduct of legal profession sufficiently compelling to uphold disciplinary action against
lawyer for in person solicitation of clients in personal injury suit). The process is equally unclear
when First Amendment associational rights are involved. Compare Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51
(1973) (binding voters, in later primary election, to choice of party in earlier primary violates right of
free association) with Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) (statute requiring registration of
party affiliation 30 days before election does not violate voters' associational rights). Some of the
teaching on the "intermediate review" standard, see note 104 supra, suggests that the balancing pro-
cess should, or may, be more deferential to the legislature than usual when two sets of First Amend-
ment interests are in conflict. Cf CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102-03 (1973)
(judicial deference to congressional balancing of competing First Amendment rights of broadcast me-
dia access). But see Karst, supra note 104, at 48 (courts should not defer to legislatures but must
themselves balance competing First Amendment interests in media access cases).
114. Neither Consolidated Edison nor Central Hudson suggests that this interest is less than com-
pelling. In Consolidated Edison the Court avoided the cognate, but different, issue of the compelled
support by ratepayers of views with which they disagree, while in Central Hudson the Court found
commercial speech rather than political speech to be involved. See note 112 supra.
115. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks
v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961);
Railway Employees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
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held in Railway Employees Department v. Hanson1 ' is no less an intru-
sion on the individual than is the restriction of the majority's right of
expression under a requirement of unanimous stockholder consent. In-
deed, to deny to private participants the power to condition the entitle-
ment of other private individuals to join with them in commercial ventures
on the latter yielding control of their funds for political purposes imposes
a less significant loss of First Amendment interests on the former than
laws authorizing union shops require of workers. It is hard to find criteria
by which to measure whether the government's compelling interest in au-
thorizing union shops in order to facilitate union organization by prevent-
ing free riders is more compelling than its interest in protecting the indi-
vidual investor's freedom of speech and enhancing his freedom of political
choice. But the Court's opinions in Hanson, International Association of
Machinists v. Street,"7 and Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks
v. Allen"'8 suggest that protecting the individual from being "forced" to
contribute to political speech he opposes responds to a more important
First Amendment concern than is offended by "forcing" him to join or
support a particular union. " 9
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,2 ' the Court found unconstitu-
tional a state law permitting a regime in which the leadership of a state
employees' union with a union shop agreement required contributions
from minority members for political speech, even when made in the legiti-
mate interest of the union and its majority. Perhaps the Constitution does
not, of its own force, protect individual workers' interests in their own
freedom of expression against similar arrangements by unions that do not
(and by law cannot) have union shop agreements.' But if the state
wishes to support those individual workers' interests, the considerations
impelling the conclusion reached in Abood point to the constitutional suf-
116. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
117. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
118. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
119. See 373 U.S. 113, 118-23 (1963); 367 U.S. 740, 756-70 (1961); 351 U.S. 225, 236-38
(1956).
120. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
121. Compare Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408, 410-11 (10th Cir. 1971) (union
shop clause authorized by National Labor Relations Act not sufficient government involvement to
support First Amendment suit by dissenting employees) with Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d
14, 16-17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971) (consensual union shop statute sufficient fed-
eral action to support suit by employee dismissed for refusing to contribute to union political fund on
religious grounds) and Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 999-1001 (9th Cir. 1970)
(alleged improper use of agency fee required from non-union employees can confer federal jurisdiction
under federal unfair labor practices laws). Variations in union-employer bargaining arrangements
may vary the applicability of the First Amendment's prohibition of union expenditure of dues for
political purposes. See Comment, supra note 86, at 416-20.
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ficiency of that state effort to limit the powers of the leadership or of a
majority of the members to use the union till so to express themselves.'22
The constitutional interest in protecting the individual's right to speak,
or his right not to have his funds used to promote views with which he
disagrees, may be less compelling for stockholders seeking to make invest-
ments than for workers seeking jobs. In form, consenting in advance to the
political use of their funds is as voluntary when individuals invest in a
corporation as when they accept employment in a union shop. They are
not required by law to invest or to accept such employment. The investor
is as free to sell his investment as the worker is to leave his job. But in
substance, the freedom to refrain from working is not equally as exercisa-
ble as the freedom to refrain from investing, because the worker's alterna-
tives are not as fungible as the investor's alternatives, and because the cost
of seeking alternatives is greater for the worker than for the investor.'
Nevertheless, in either case, consenting in advance to the use of funds for
expression on an infinity of subjects cannot realistically be characterized
as voluntary. If most companies would "bundle" the power to make polit-
ical and economic decisions, as is likely in the absence of government pro-
hibition, 2 ' the freedom of investors to go elsewhere would be costly, if not
wholly illusory.' Moreover, exercise of the freedom to "exit"'2 6 would
leave the investor's enterprise free to use his previously contributed funds
for the very political purposes he finds offensive. Hence, whether or not
the First Amendment forbids a state from conditioning access to invest-
ments on the same onerous terms that it forbids a state from conditioning
access to jobs where union shops prevail, the First Amendment interests of
investors offer comparable support for a state regulation forbidding pri-
vate parties from so conditioning access to investments.'
122. The fact that constitutional prohibitions may not reach private arrangements-even arrange-
ments the law tolerates-does not frustrate the power of the state to offer protection for members
against such otherwise permissible arrangements.
123. Cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 81 & n.13 (1975) (early corrupt practices legislation evinced
greater concern for union members than for shareholders since former more likely to be coerced into
membership).
124. See Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union Campaign
Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 148, 156-57 (1974).
125. This suggests that the union shop configuration is a more apposite analogy than union re-
quirements that members yield political rights in "right-to-work" states. But see First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978) (suggesting latter is more apt analogy).
126. See id. (shareholder "free to withdraw his investment at any time"). But exit may be difficult
for pension fund or other fund beneficiaries.
127. Cf Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (private parties may not com-
bine to exclude others from publishing). That both state and federal governments have long tolerated,
indeed authorized, political action by union leadership and corporate management using collective
funds without consultation with stockholders or members does not preclude this conclusion. But see
Bolton, supra note 3, at 413 (past legality of corporate and union political activity undermines state
interest in protecting individual freedom of expression of group members). The requisite compelling
state interest need not be "necessary" to the state's survival. It is sufficient, particularly when each
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If a compelling state interest is found, the question remains whether the
means of furthering that interest is the "least restrictive means," or is
sufficiently "narrowly drawn."128 The concept of "least restrictive means"
requires a degree of restrictiveness appropriate for the level of effective-
ness sought in the regulation. Applying the concept, therefore, involves
striking the right balance of protectiveness and restrictiveness by compar-
ing at the margins the degree of protection the regulation offers the pro-
tected interest with the extent of the deprivation of speech the regulation
imposes. The indeterminacy of the process belies the apparent rigor of the
formula. 29 Application of the formula is particularly puzzling in the pre-
sent context, which pits the protection of individuals' First Amendment
rights to refrain from supporting speech against the public's First Amend-
ment interest in the exchange of views and opinions. Does the least re-
strictive of the alternatives mean the narrowest protection of speakers con-
sistent with the broadest protection of the public, or does it mean the
narrowest intrusion on the audience's interest consistent with the broadest
protection of speakers' rights? If the answer is somewhere in between,
how should a court determine where?
Decisions like Hanson, Street, Allen, Pipefitters Local No. 562 v.
United States,30 and Abood cast some light on the appropriate balance."'
They imply that permitting the creation of the union's treasury by check-
offs from union dues and allowing political use of that treasury subject to
rebates to dissenting members, or creating separate segregated funds made
up of voluntary contributions solicited by use of corporate funds, would
adequately protect union members' or stockholders' rights. But these pre-
scriptions do not mean that the Constitution forbids the government from
offering greater protection for such individuals.
3 2
competing interest may arguably claim to further the aspirations embodied in the First Amendment,
that the state has chosen to act with a goal that reflects a basic or substantial interest and has chosen a
means that closely "fits" that goal. The number of investors involved is substantial, and while the
number of potential dissidents can only be estimated, it is far from trivial. See notes 13 & 14 supra.
128. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540-43 (regulation
restricting speech must be "precisely drawn"); cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (requiring less-
than-strict scrutiny).
129. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1484-90 (1975); Gunther, Reflections on Robel:
It's Not What the Court Did But the Way That It Did It, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1140, 1147-48 (1968);
Note, Less Drastic leans and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
130. 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
131. See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 543 (1980) (inti-
mating that excluding the costs of bill inserts from the rate base might be acceptable method of bal-
ancing competing interests).
132. The constitutional requirement of proration ordered in those cases did not reject-nor does it
logically preclude-a legislative judgment that the appropriate remedy was a requirement of unani-
mous membership consent. The courts repeatedly emphasize the constitutional concern that union
members' political contributions be entirely voluntary. See Pipefitters Local No. 562 v. United States,
407 U.S. 385, 427 (1972); Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 118 (1963);
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One means of providing greater protection would be to require a sepa-
rate segregated fund, to be raised only by stockholder solicitation of contri-
butions from others, rather than to allow political use of corporate assets
and subsequent pro rata rebates to dissenting stockholders. So long as
stockholders are free to use their own money and facilities to raise such a
fund for political speech, a requirement of unanimous stockholder consent
to each and every corporate utterance of political speech would not offend
the First Amendment, even though it would effectively prohibit political
speech by the corporation. On that premise, the most the government need
assure to stockholders is access to stockholder lists so that they may them-
selves raise separate segregated funds for political purposes. It is not nec-
essary to authorize management's use of corporate funds to solicit and
administer contributions from stockholders for PACs in the manner the
Federal Election Campaign Act authorizes.1
3
1
Such an arrangement for a separate segregated fund protects the minor-
ity against non-volitional contributions more effectively than does a
United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755, 760-64 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973); FEC v.
National Educ. Ass'n, 457 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C. 1978). But cf International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740, 772 (1961) (suggesting impropriety of a blanket prohibition of such union ex-
penditures); Comment, Regulation of Labor's Political Contributions and Expenditures: The British
and American Experience, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 371, 385-88 (1952) (questioning similarly categorical
restrictions on union political expenditures).
133. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1976) (permitting expenditure of corporate and union funds for
"the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be
utilized for political purposes"). See Vandegrift, The Corporate Political Action Committee, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 422, 456-58 (1980); Comment, Corporate Political Action Committees: Effect of the
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 756 (1977). While the
use of corporate funds and facilities to create and operate segregated political funds appears to be
common, see Budde, The Practical Role of Corporate PAC's in the Political Process, 22 ARIZ. L.
REV. 555 (1980); Mayton, Politics, Money, Coercion, and the Problem with Corporate PACs, 29
EMORY L.J. 375, 387 (1980), such use is itself an abuse of the assets of those stockholders with views
opposed to the purposes of the segregated fund. Moreover, it gives management an advantage in the
process of fund raising that is denied to opposing stockholders and that is not justified by the fact that
it is a familiar allocation of advantages and disadvantages in the proxy area. The fact that stockholder
volition in making contributions is not as easily coerced as employee volition, see Mayton, supra, at
382-85, does not lessen the government's interest in denying management a role in the PAC. In any
event, whether or not anything in the First Amendment precludes giving management such control
over PACs, it is difficult to see what entitles management, or even a majority of stockholders, to be
able to retain that control in the face of a legislative choice to let stockholder efforts solve the entire
matter. Indeed, the phenomenal growth of corporate PACs suggests that stbckholders' assets are being
used quite extensively to finance the creation, maintenance, and operation of the segregated funds by
management.
It has been suggested that gifts by corporate PACs have simply substituted for individual gifts by
businessmen and corporate executives, or have furnished a mechanism to legalize formerly illegal gifts
by corporations. See Epstein, Business and Labor Under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
in PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 107, 140-41 (M. Malbin ed. 1980);
Malbin, Of Mountains and Molehills: PACs Campaigns and Public Policy, in PARTIES, INTEREST
GROUPS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS, supra, at 152; Malbin, Neither a Mountain Nor A Mole-
hill, 3 REG., May/June 1979, at 41. Whether or not the suggestion is accurate, the First Amendment
should not hamper the government's efforts to forbid corporate assets from underpinning corporate
PACs, unless those efforts selectively discriminate on the basis of the content of particular corporate
speech.
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scheme of rebates. The latter requires the individual to incur the cost of
making the claim to obtain a return of funds, and to risk revealing the
political views with which he disagrees,"" rather than simply to refrain
from revealing his preferences and from contributing funds in his posses-
sion in response to the solicitation. 3 In the case of widely dispersed stock-
holders who can readily liquidate their investment, those considerations
are of considerable significance.' 36 Allowing such aggregative action
outside the corporate structure satisfactorily accommodates both the rights
of the minority not to yield their First Amendment entitlements to the
majority and the rights of the latter to act collectively to amplify their
speech entitlements.'37
That accomodation, moreover, does not "[burn] down the house to roast
the pig."'38 The public's interest in the potential content of corporate
speech does not require maturing that potential by any more government
assistance than is necessary to enable the stockholders to organize them-
selves for conveying such messages without the use of corporate assets.
The societal interest in the receipt of the messages no more prohibits gov-
ernment from protecting investors against having to support the purvey-
ance of views they oppose than it requires them to support corporate
134. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 241 (1977) (dissenting union member need
only express general opposition to ideological expenditures, since to require greater specificity would
violate his freedom to hold beliefs without public disclosure); L. TRIBE, supra note 54, at 589 n.5.
135. But cf Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 414-15 (1972) (concern whether
contributions by union members to segregated fund are "voluntary").
136. Such stockholders may well be induced to sell their securities rather than to claim rebates for
the political use of their funds. Government protection against the transaction costs, including income
tax costs, of claiming a pro rata share of political expenditures reasonably requires a rule of unani-
mous consent, particularly if the amount of the payment is less than the cost of getting it. The ease
with which the investor can opt out, by selling his stock, compared to the cost of seeking his rebate
may make such protection more appropriate for investors than for union members, whose level of
participation in such matters in the union is apt to be more intense. Moreover, pension fund benefi-
ciaries may be unable to opt out, or feasibly to be given rebates.
137. It is difficult to find anything in the Constitution that requires the majority's interest in
avoiding the transaction costs of organizing separately to be favored over the minority's interest in
avoiding the transaction costs of seeking rebates.
138. United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 596 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Bellotti purports
to distinguish Abood's premises, in part on the ground that the remedy in Abood did not preclude the
leadership-that is, the majority-from expressing itself through use of the union treasury; it merely
required a rebate of the minority's funds. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34
(1978). See also United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 149-50 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring). But
rebate is not the only permissible mode of vindicating dissenters' rights; indeed, the Constitution sup-
ports greater protection for stockholders, see note 132 supra, in order to assure them of volition com-
parable to the extensive assurance of volitional behavior required for union dissenters. See Pipefitters
Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 414-15 (1972). The Supreme Court has noted that the
union leaders' discretion under a rebate scheme calls for clear efforts to protect the employee's free-
dom not to dedicate his funds to political issues. Hence, it is appropriate to require an arrangement
that imposes on the union the burden of computing and giving effective notice of members' entitle-
ments. See Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963); International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 775 (1961).
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waste.'39 In sum, although a rebate scheme may be a permissible accom-
modation of all the relevant interests in the corporate context, a legislative
judgment that the voluntary contribution arrangement is preferable is not
constitutionally offensive.
III. Political Speech, Commercial Speech, and Beyond
The conclusion that the First Amendment permits the government to
preclude delegation of the power to spend corporate funds on political
speech to corporate management or to mere majoritarian stockholder deci-
sion does not end the inquiry. Assuming that the state does not wish to
subject all corporate speech-political, commercial, and other-to a re-
quirement of shareholder consent, may it restrict some kinds of corporate
speech in a different manner than it restricts other kinds?
Vindication of individual stockholder's First Amendment rights does not
require the government to impose a stockholder consent requirement ei-
ther for all corporate speech or for none. Differential regulation of corpo-
rate political speech and corporate commercial speech is constitutionally
permissible if, as the Court has stated, commercial speech is entitled to a
lower level of protection under the First Amendment than is "political"
speech.'40 In addition, as we shall see, the cost of giving stockholders pro-
tection for the former may be much greater than for the latter. Hence, it is
far from self-evident that the First Amendment requires the same consen-
sual arrangements among stockholders for corporate commercial speech
that it permits, and indeed supports, for corporate political speech.
A. The Distinction Between Political and Commercial Speech
To acknowledge the permissibility of differential treatment of political,
commercial, and possibly other categories of speech implies that the outer
boundaries of political speech are determinable. This in turn raises the
139. Nor does the First Amendment require that corporations be permitted to contribute to or
expend funds on behalf of the many trade associations engaged in political activity or the molding of
public opinion. Cf 93 CONG. REC. 6438-39 (1947) (testimony of Senator Taft suggesting that corpo-
rations would be prohibited under Taft-Hartley Act from contributing to trade associations that in
turn made political contributions). But cf Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing
v. City of Berkeley, 102 S. Ct. 434 (1981) (S250 limit on contributions to committees formed to
influence public referenda violates First Amendment). That the First Amendment permits manage-
ment to make political and charitable contributions does not mean that it requires that management
be authorized to make them. Cf California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 101 S. Ct. 2712 (1981) (S5000
limit on annual contributions by individuals and unincorporated associations to multicandidate politi-
cal committees does not violate First Amendment).
140. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2891-92 (1981); Central Hud-
son Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980); Ohralick v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
Vol. 91: 235, 1981
Corporate Free Speech
question whether such determinations can be made with sufficient preci-
sion to meet constitutional standards.
It may be argued that it is impossible to define impeded speech as "po-
litical speech" without violating the stricture against government interfer-
ence with the "content" of speech. The neutrality that the Supreme Court
has required of government regulation of speech seems to prohibit any
and all differential treatment based upon the content of speech, or even
upon its subject matter. 4' While the Court appears to have retreated from
the rigor of that prohibition when obscenity is singled out for regula-
tion, 1 2 the centrality of political speech to the democratic process'43 makes
the Court's mandate most rigorous when legislation curtails political
speech. Nevertheless, in a number of circumstances the Court has upheld
the singling out of political speech for a particular restriction not applica-
ble to other kinds of speech.'" Although the criteria applied in those deci-
sions are not entirely clear, a fair reading of the cases suggests that the
proposals under consideration here satisfy those criteria.
In the majority of these cases, the Court held that the government was
entitled to refrain from offering, or from requiring others to offer, to polit-
ical speakers facilities made readily available to cultural or commercial
speakers. The governmental interests thought sufficiently important to
permit political speakers to be denied access to a relevant medium of com-
munication in these cases'45 are different from those involved in the effort
to preserve shareholders' individual rights of expression or of refraining
from expression.' 4  But it is hard to identify considerations that make
those interests any more "compelling," particularly when so vindicating
individual shareholders' rights does not deny the communication to listen-
ers, and its only cost is to require those groups of shareholders who wish
to speak collectively to do so outside the corporate structure.' 47 Assuming,
141. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85 (1977); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Police Dep't v. Mosely,
408 U.S. 92 (1972).
142. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); cf Snepp v. United States,
444 U.S. 507 (1980) (secrecy clause in former CIA employee's employment contract enforceable).
143. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978): Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1,
14-15 (1976); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 266 (1964); T. EMERSON, supra note 54, at 7.
144. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298 (1974); cf Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding FCC require-
ment that licensees provide right of reply to persons who are subject to verbal "personal attacks").
145. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (business of a military installation is "to train
soldiers, not to provide a public forum"); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304
(1974) (permitting political advertising would jeopardize long-term commercial advertising, subject
users of the buses and trolleys "to the blare of political propaganda," and create "lurking doubts
about favoritism").
146. See also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); CBS v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
147. See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67 (1972); Cammarano v. United
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therefore, that it is permissible to single out corporate political speech for
regulation, the question remains whether a constitutionally satisfactory
line can be drawn between political speech and other corporate speech.
Although the inquiry touches upon "protected speech," in the present
context judicial scrutiny less exacting than the demands of First Amend-
ment due process, such as "intermediate" review"" or a "rational basis"
standard, may appropriately test the line to be drawn between political
and other types of speech. If the line were designed to separate protected
political speech from less protected commercial speech149 in order to pre-
vent undue restriction of the former, the process would appropriately re-
quire "exacting scrutiny"-a "clearly drawn" line that is "least restric-
tive" for its purpose. But if the corporation's political speech may be
impeded to the extent necessary to protect shareholders' freedom of
speech, the relaxation of that impediment by eliminating the restriction on
nonpolitical speech should not require the clarity of statement or tightness
of coverage that might otherwise be appropriate.1i 0 On that premise, a
"substantial basis" for the regulatory effort would leave some play in the
joints, and so long as the proscription gives adequate notice to those it
governs, a satisfactory line can be drawn.
The narrowest definition of political speech-as Buckley v. Valeo"'
suggests-is speech expressly urging or opposing the election of particular
candidates,5"' or the adoption of particular rules of law by legislatures,
administrative agencies, or courts. But communication need not be explicit
to have the same effect in encouraging the election or defeat of candidates
or the adoption or repeal of governmental policies."' Considerations un-
derlying the First Amendment urge a broad view of such implicit political
speech when the object is to facilitate self-government and to protect mi-
States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959). But c Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
251 (1974) (right of reply statute struck down despite impossibility of entry into print media). That
speech may be uttered elsewhere or by someone else is, in itself, no justification for a government
restriction on, or aimed at, content or subject matter. See L. TRIBE, supra note 54, at 603. But that
principle does not apply with equal power to government efforts to protect the First Amendment
interests of individuals in order to prevent them from being forced to speak against their will. Id. at
604.
148. See note 104 supra.
149. Compare First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down regulation that
singled out particular political speech for less protection) with Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,
101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981) (striking down regulation that separated particular commercial speech from
less protected commercial and political speech).
150. Cf Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO.
L.J. 727, 747-48 (1980) (government regulation of speech should be constitutional if inter alia it is
sufficiently closely related and limited to legitimate goal).
151. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
152. Id. at 43-44.
153. See note 22 supra. But cf FEC v. AFSCME, 471 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1979) ("Pardon
Me" poster illustrating Nixon pardon does not express advocacy). See also Bolton, supra note 3, at
419-22.
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norities' rights in the governmental process against majoritarian restric-
tion. 4 The same considerations urge an equally broad definition of politi-
cal speech when the object is to protect individual investors against being
required to permit use of their assets to support corporate speech dictated
by management or by a mere majority of the stockholders.
Those considerations suggest that a definition of political speech should
include at least conventional "issue" advertising or "advocacy" advertising
designed to condition public opinion along particular policy or ideological
lines. The questions, for example, whether government intrusion into sci-
entific research by universities, or whether private rather than governmen-
tal pursuit of new sources of energy is socially or economically desirable
are within the ambit of political speech. So too are discussions of regula-
tory pressures that contribute to high prices, of the reasons for inflation,
or of the public interest in the reinvestment of unusually high profits.' 5
The effect, not to mention the intent, of such communications is to influ-
ence public opinion on matters of government policy."6 The fact that such
speech may be a more remote cause of governmental action than more
explicit requests for such action"s7 does not lessen the need-or the entitle-
ment-of members of a group to protection against being forced to sup-
port, by such speech, political views they oppose. Thus, whether or not
the political speech to be protected is as broad as Meiklejohn suggests,"'
there is every reason to make the circle of protected speech large.
Indeed, there is reason to offer protection beyond even broadly defined
political speech to all matters of opinion. The Supreme Court has pointed
154. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 1-27 "(1948) (First Amendment derives from "basic
American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage"); Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 256-57; note 143 supra. But cf. BeVier,
The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle,
30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978) (First Amendment protects only speech that participates in processes of
democratic government and does not advocate or incite unlawful acts); Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 24-35 (1971) (First Amendment protects only
explicitly political speech discussing government).
155. See, e.g., IRS Hearings, supra note 10, at 583-989 (illustrating variety of such ads); P.
SETHI, supra note 10, at 21-52, 138-78 (same). Unlike traditional image advertising, "advocacy adver-
tising" is concerned with "the propagation of ideas and elucidation of controversial social issues of
public importance in a manner that supports the position and interests of the sponsor while expressly
denying the accuracy of facts and downgrading the sponsor's opponents." Id. at 7. See also Sethi,
Issue-Oriented Corporate Advertising: Tax Treatment of Expenditures, 19 CAL. MAN. REV. 5 (1976)
(distinguishing among types of advertising for purposes of deductibility of expenses); Comment, supra
note 19, at 647-67 (discussing advocacy advertising by insurance companies seeking to affect outcome
of jury verdicts in automobile negligence cases).
156. See P. SETHI, supra note 10, at 1-72.
157. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1976) (distinction between advocacy of issues and
advocacy of particular candidates often dissolves in practice); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S.
498, 504-05 (1959) (refusing to distinguish between legislative lobbying and advertising made to in-
fluence public referenda for purposes of tax deductibility).
158. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 256-63; Wel-
lington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1110-21 (1979) (discussing Meiklejohn).
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out that whether the views expressed concern social questions, matters of
aesthetics or literary quality, human behavior in general, or the condition
of the universe, the government cannot force people to support views they
do not hold.'1 9 This teaching argues for the constitutional validity of gov-
ernment efforts to prevent private groups from forcing members to pay for
publishing opinions or general views on "matters of public concern"16
that they oppose, and from conditioning the opportunity to invest in com-
mercial enterprises on agreeing to such payments.
The essential problem, then, is not how large or how small the circle of
protected speech should be, but how to define its boundaries in order to
give adequate notice of the requirement imposed. The problem is difficult
because an item of speech can combine political matters, commercial mat-
ters, and matters of opinion on subjects having nothing to do with political
or commercial matters; the solution may therefore require disentangling
the political or commercial component from the others. But to the extent
that the government's interest is in protecting investors from being forced
to contribute to the utterance of views that they oppose, the teaching of
Hanson and Abood suggests the possibility of a constitutionally acceptable
path through the tangle. In those cases, the Court made a constitutional
distinction between funds spent for "collective bargaining, contract admin-
istration, and grievance-adjustment purposes," and funds spent for "politi-
cal and ideological purposes unrelated to collective bargaining."'' Abood
also recognized that some speech falls clearly into neither category, 6 and
thus that "[t]here will . . . be difficult problems in drawing lines between
collective-bargaining activities, for which contributions may be compelled,
and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining, for which such
compulsion is prohibited."' 63 Nevertheless, the Court in Abood was able
to identify a constitutionally tolerable distinction.
The corporate analogue to "collective bargaining, contract administra-
tion, and grievance adjustment" is the conduct of corporate business, in-
cluding the offering of goods or services for sale. Under that analogy, gov-
ernment can require unanimous stockholder consent for the expenditure of
any corporate funds for "political" purposes, 6 " or for any communication
159. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (no one should
be made to subscribe to government prescribed orthodoxy "in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion").
160. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens For A Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 635 (1980).
161. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977). See International Ass'n of Ma-
chinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 764, 769 (1961).
162. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977).
163. Id. (footnote omitted).
164. Singling out corporate "political" contributions for special treatment has a long history. See,
e.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-116 (McKinney 1978); notes 3, 16, & 17 supra.
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to the public 6' that does not merely offer the corporation's services or
products for sale or solicit offers to buy its products or services, or that
does "more than propose a commercial transaction."'' There should be
no greater difficulty in drawing this line in a manner consistent with the
First Amendment than is present when distinguishing between expendi-
tures for the operation of union business and union expenditures for polit-
ical purposes.
To be sure, the same communication may serve a general business pur-
pose-like improving the image of the corporation as a public-spirited,
socially responsible enterprise or as a reliable and innovative provider of
products or services-and at the same time advocate views of general so-
cial or political import. Alternatively, it may both offer a specific commer-
cial transaction and explicitly enunciate views on general social or politi-
cal issues. But the formulation of a prescription that separates, with
adequate notice, speech requiring stockholder consent from speech not re-
quiring it is no more difficult than separating commercial from noncom-
mercial speech. Existing doctrine currently requires precisely such a sepa-
ration in order to apply the different levels of judicial review to the
different levels of government regulation that the Constitution authorizes
for commercial and noncommercial speech."1
7
To conclude that the state may effectively separate corporate political
speech from corporate commercial speech does not address the question of
whether some forms of corporate political speech may be regulated differ-
ently from others. For example, does the premise of protecting the stock-
holder's First Amendment rights permit the state to require shareholder
consent for grass roots campaigns, but not for direct presentations by cor-
porate representatives to congressional committees or to Congress?" ' Does
165. The prohibition could include communications on public matters to shareholders, employees,
customers, or suppliers. See IRS Hearings, supra note 10, at 76-141.
166. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771
n.24 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
385 (1973)).
167. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2889-92, 2896 (1981); Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-66 (1980); Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens For A Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); cf Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977) (overbreadth doctrine less applicable to commercial than political speech);
Fed. Com. Comm'n, Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, 39 Fed. Reg. 26372, 26380-84
(1974) (fairness doctrine should be applied differently to editorial and commercial advertising); Bird,
Goldman & Lawrence, Corporate Image Advertising: A Discussion of the Factors that Distinguish
Those Corporate Image Advertising Practices Protected Under the First Amendment From Those
Subject to Control by the Federal Trade Commission, 51 J. URB. L. 405 (1974) (distinguishing "im-
age" ads from commercial ads). See also National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978) (upholding prohibition on false advertising con-
cerning health impact of cholesterol).
168. Compare I.R.C. § 162(e) (allowing deduction for business expenses incurred for appearance
before legislative committees or communication with legislators with respect to legislation of direct
interest to the taxpayer but not for participation in political campaigns) with 40 CONG. REC. 96
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it allow a requirement of shareholder consent for radio and television po-
litical ads but not for similar ads in the print media, or for political action
on the state or local level but not on the national level (or vice versa)?
In general, regulation of "subject matter," and certainly of "content," is
properly viewed as forbidden. 69 But this does not necessarily imply that
the First Amendment requires either that all forms of corporate political
speech must be subject to stockholder consent or that no forms of such
speech may be. Constitutionally valid distinctions can be made among dif-
ferent media or forms for the expression 7 ° of political speech in the pre-
sent context. The long-standing distinction between grass roots campaigns
and legislative appearances, for example, has a persuasive claim to consti-
tutional validity."' 1 On the other hand, many other distinctions may not be
constitutionally tolerable. The statute involved in Bellotti, for example,
may have been aimed at a kind of speech that was so particular that
neither the premise of protecting stockholder First Amendment rights nor
any other legislative goal was adequate to justify so special a restriction."7 '
It is beyond the scope of this article to determine, or even to examine,
the lines that may properly be drawn. But there is reason to doubt the
necessity for invoking the conventional jurisprudence of First Amendment
due process to test the propriety of such lines. The government action to
be assessed does not restrict the rights of individuals to speak. Rather, it
seeks to restrict the rights of individuals to apply private economic pres-
sure on others to contribute to the former's speech. Collective speech
through the corporation is thus curtailed, but it is available through paral-
lel group action by stockholders. Such an array of competing claims on
First Amendment values does not generate the same questions that direct
restrictions on individual speech pose. Hence, distinctions among such re-
strictions may appropriately be tested by less exacting scrutiny-at least
when the restrictions are not aimed at the particular content of
(1905) (Roosevelt message to Congress arguing that any corporate expenditures on legislation should
be unlawful except those for counsel hired for legal services).
169. See note 141 supra.
170. The impermissibility of distinctions based upon content need not afflict distinctions based on
form or mode of expression. See L. TRIBE, supra note 54, at 693-700; Bollinger, Freedom of the Press
and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1,
22-24, 32-37 (1976); Farber, supra note 150; Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play
in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 285-96 (1981). See also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
748-50 (1978); Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584-86 (D.D.C. 1971), aft'd,
405 U.S. 1000 (1972); Note, Advertisements for Contraceptives as Commercial Speech in the Broad-
cast Media, 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 336, 341-43 (1981).
171. See note 168 supra. But cf Note, Grassroots Lobbying and the Public's Right to Hear: First
Amendment Implications of I.R.C. Section 162(e)(2)(B), 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 597 (1981) (grassroots
lobbying "a vital form of political speech").
172. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 793 (1978).
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speech' 73-than is required for testing the validity of direct restrictions on
individuals' speech.""
B. Government Regulation of Corporate Commercial Speech
The considerations that make a requirement of stockholder consent for
corporate political speech compatible with the First Amendment are less
evident when other forms of speech are considered, such as commercial
speech or "cultural" speech. Indeed, with respect to commercial speech,'75
the result is curiously problematic.
The problem arises in part because of the need, which bringing com-
mercial speech under the First Amendment emphasizes, to fashion regula-
tory distinctions based upon the differing content or subject matter of the
speech. In the resulting hierarchy of values, less protection is available for
commercial speech than for political speech; it is possible that still an-
other, intermediate, level of protection may be appropriate for speech that
is too far removed from social action or opinion to be characterized as
political and yet too remote from business or commercial transactions to
be characterized as commercial. 76 But wherever any particular speech
may rank in the hierarchy, there is no doubt that, under the cases, com-
mercial speech is entitled to less protection than political speech."7
The lower value thus assigned to commercial speech creates an appar-
ent anomaly when the regulatory effort rests on the need to protect share-
holders' rights under the First Amendment. To impose the same consent
requirement for each corporate commercial ad as for each corporate politi-
cal utterance is to rest the regulation on the need to protect the individual
stockholder's interest in a corporate communication that concerns the
wholly volitional exchange transactions for which he made his investment.
But a state could fairly conclude that the investor's interest in such speech
is entitled to no more protection against delegation of authority to man-
agement than is his interest in the commercial transaction itself. So long
as the corporation's speech is neither political nor concerned with other
173. If the distinction between speech for which stockholder consent is required and speech for
which it is not is based solely on the content of the particular speech, its propriety merits First
Amendment review, as it would if the government regulation directly prohibited a particular item of
speech. While formally the regulation may be viewed as designed to prescribe the terms on which
scattered investors may make business investments without yielding their First Amendment rights,
substantively, it should be viewed quite differently. Its purpose may be to make one message less
easily communicable than another.
174. See note 104 supra.
175. An example would be a requirement of stockholder consent for advertising campaigns for
sales to minors or for particular kinds of ads even though no legal restriction were imposed on sales of
cigarettes.
176. See p. 286 infra.
177. See note 167 supra.
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matters of opinion with which the investor may have ideological or other
normative disagreement, he has a less critical interest in preventing the
"abuse" of his investment to finance the speech. Not only are the claims of
individual investors for regulation of corporate commercial speech apt to
be less compelling than those for regulating corporate political speech, but
the cost to investors of restricting the former is apt to be much greater.
Regulating corporate commercial speech reduces the likelihood that any-
one will utter the communication more than does similar regulation of
corporate political speech. For a state to require unanimous shareholder
consent, or even prior consultation with stockholders, for particular com-
mercial speech would interfere with the firm's day-to-day commercial op-
eration on a vast variety of matters that are subject to an equally vast
variety of views."' Since the required consent could not be obtained rap-
idly enough for such daily commercial purposes, and since a separate fund
for such purposes is impractical,179 any such requirement would effectively
forbid commercial speech. Similar regulation of political-or possibly
other noncommercial-speech by corporations would not have the same
crippling effect.
These considerations imply that the First Amendment offers less sup-
port for, and a greater obstacle to, regulation of corporate commercial
speech than corporate political speech. The apparent incongruity requires
further analysis of the rationale for protecting commercial speech.
If the concept of commercial speech could be confined, in its import as
well as in its terms, to nothing more than the offer of a commercial trans-
action, the mainspring for its protection under the First Amendment
would be extracted. Thus defined, commercial speech would not rationally
be entitled to protection under the First Amendment 8' any more than is
178. As one author pointed out: "Probably all shareholders wish General Motors to prosper. Not
all would wish to express the opinion that an Oldsmobile Cutlass is a great buy. Indeed, some share-
holders certainly believe that General Motors should advertise more truthfully, some that it should
advertise less truthfully, and some that it should not advertise at all." O'Kelley, supra note 30, at
1373.
179. While the creation of alternative PAC-like sources of funds may dilute the impact of the
prohibition, the magnitude of the amounts to be solicited and the limited appeal of the solicitation
might produce obstacles that are sufficiently onerous to make the requirement of stockholder consent
testable as though it were a total suppression of commercial speech.
180. The First Amendment purports to distinguish speech (however interpreted) from other forms
of behavior. It suggests, if it does not not compel, an offer of greater protection against government
restrictions on the pursuit and communication of information and ideas, on debate over them and over
political issues and social values, or on communicative entertainment, than on the purchase or sale of
goods or other kinds of non-communicative behavior. See Wellington, supra note 158. The limits of
the protection the First Amendment offers are uncertain, and may be sought in the definition of
"speech" or by deriving from the language, structure, and purposes of the Constitution permissible
functions or values speech may serve. In so determining its limits, there is little room for the protec-
tion of commercial transactions (not involving speech as a commodity) or of speech whose sole func-
tion is to facilitate such transactions. The Court in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), justified bringing commercial speech under the First
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the language used in a contract or in a fraudulent representation,' or
than is the buy-sell transaction itself.8 '
But whatever regulation may be appropriate for such purely commer-
Amendment on the notion that
society also may have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information. Even an
individual advertisement, though entirely 'commercial,' may be of general public interest. The
facts of decided cases furnish illustrations: advertisements stating that referral service for legal
abortions are available; that a manufacturer of artificial furs promotes his product as an alter-
native to the extinction by his competitors of fur-bearing mammals; and that a domestic pro-
ducer advertises his product as an alternative to imports that tend to deprive American re-
sidents of their jobs. Obviously, not all commercial messages contain the same or even a very
great public interest element. There are few to which such an element, however, could not be
added ...
Moreover, there is another consideration that suggests that no line between publicly 'inter-
esting' or 'important' commercial advertising and the opposite kind could ever be drawn....
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our re-
sources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a
matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.
To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. . . . And if it is indis-
pensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensa-
ble to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or
altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to
enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of infor-
mation does not serve that goal.
Id. at 764-65 (footnotes and citations omitted). While the argument in the latter paragraph is flawed,
see Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA.
L. REV., 1, 14-18 (1979), the argument in the former paragraph remains troublesome-even if empir-
ically there is reason to doubt that it has large import.
181. See Farber, supra note 67, at 384-91.
182. Viewed purely as a matter of commercial regulation, when the government constitutionally
forbids a transaction, the First Amendment should not prevent the government from also forbidding a
speaker from offering to engage in the transaction. Cf Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 (1976) (suggesting commercial ads could be banned if
proposed transaction illegal). In that circumstance, the consumer's entitlement to be free of restrictions
on offers does not rise above the speaker's right to offer. The notion that the First Amendment pro-
tects speech advocating violation of the law rests, at least in part, on considerations derived from the
chilling effect such prohibitions may have on advocacy of changes in the law, and the value of initiat-
ing test litigation. See Wellington, supra note 158, at 1138-42. Those considerations, however, do not
preclude foreclosing speech soliciting commercial transactions that the law forbids. As has been noted,
commercial speech is less easily chilled than other speech. See note 89 supra. Hence, there is less
reason to allow commercial speech soliciting the forbidden transaction in order to protect speech advo-
cating repeal of the prohibition. Cf NLRB v. Retail Stores Employees Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607,
614-15 (1980) (union prohibited from unlawfully picketing employer's customers); Bates v. State Bar,
433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (ads for illegal transactions may lawfully be suppressed); Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (publication of ads solicit-
ing narcotics or prostitution could be forbidden). Whether the government should be able to forbid all
public offers of or ads for transactions whose consummation it does not forbid presents a closer ques-
tion. That it has long done so is plain. See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582,
583-86 (D.D.C. 1971), afl'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972) (ban on cigarette advertising on radio and televi-
sion); 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976) (same); 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1976) (ban on broadcasting lottery ads);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 32-7-26 & 32-7-28 (1974) (advertising or soliciting orders for alcholic beverages
prohibited). See also Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932) (ban on billboard tobacco advertising
not denial of equal protection). To be sure, even in the regulation of commercial affairs the Constitu-
tion does not assure that the greater power always includes the lesser. But an otherwise unchallenge-
able ban on offers for the sale of commercial goods whose sale the government could constitutionally
forbid should not offend the First Amendment merely because the government seeks to discourage,
rather than prohibit, the sale transaction.
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cial speech, most corporate speech typically contains both commercial and
noncommercial elements. Any given commercial speech may contain more
than merely an offer of a commercial transaction; it may also have im-
plicit political or social import, t 3 or may be cast in language or symbols
that please or enrich the listener in ways that are too remote from matters
of opinion or social concern to be called political. The political impact or
the pleasure and enrichment the viewer receives from the "cultural" as-
pects of the communication, both of which are within the reach of the
First Amendment, may be quite independent of any influence on the
viewer's decision to accept or reject the proposed commercial transaction.
Nothing in the Supreme Court's opinions on the subject helps to deter-
mine which of these types of speech any particular commercial utterance
embodies. Indeed, the Court's decision to bring commercial speech under
the protection of the First Amendment rested in part on the Court's stated
inability to determine when speech is "merely" commercial and when it
has broader import of the kind the First Amendment attempts to pro-
tect."84 Under that rationale, if the state may require stockholder consent
for corporate political speech, it may also require stockholder consent for
corporate speech in which the commercial is not extricable from the politi-
cal. Of course, such a requirement may impose an intolerable burden on
corporate commercial activity. But it is not necessary to impose such a
burden in order to protect stockholders' First Amendment interests in po-
litical or noncommercial speech.
Although it may, the state is not required to give the same protection to
the stockholder's interest in corporate political speech when the political
message is part of commercial speech as when it is not part of commercial
speech. Since the state is not obliged to protect the stockholder by a con-
sent requirement, the high cost of such a requirement is sufficient consti-
tutional justification for not imposing it on corporate commercial speech.
The state may choose to require stockholder consent for corporate com-
183. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 579-81
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92-98
(1977); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820-21 (1975); cf Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for A
Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 628-32 (1980) (commercial and informative messages intertwined
in solicitations for funds). See also Prentice, supra note 100, at 654; Rotunda, The Commercial
Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080. If the social or political aspects of
commercial utterance were explicit and separable from the commercial aspects, regulation of only the
former but not the latter aspects by requiring investor consent would not burden corporate business
operations.
184. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764-
65 (1976). See also Baker, supra note 97, at 42 n.146 (discussing attempts to define commercial
speech); Kaufman, The Medium, the Message and the First Amendment, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761,
769 (1970) (frequently difficult to separate commercial speech and protected speech). But cf Jackson
& Jeffries, supra note 180, at 19-25 (improper to abandon distinction between commercial and politi-
cal speech merely because it may be difficult to draw in some cases).
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mercial speech that has political import only when it finds that the cost is
not prohibitive. For example, the state appropriately may (or may not)
require such consent when the speech takes the form of advocacy advertis-
ing even if it also contains an express offer of products or services for sale
on specified terms. Although not a simple matter, drawing an appropriate
line between commercial speech that can thus be regulated and commer-
cial speech that cannot is no more difficult than drawing a large variety of
valid regulatory distinctions in economic affairs based on estimates of cost
differentials."t 5
In any event, there is reason to allow the state to regulate corporate
commercial speech even if it declines to regulate corporate political or
other noncommercial speech. The essential justification for bringing com-
mercial speech within the First Amendment is its noncommercial im-
port."86 Without that import, commercial speech is nothing more than part
of a buy-sell transaction, for which the First Amendment is irrelevant. If
the government may decline to protect stockholders with respect to the
noncommercial import of corporate commercial speech," 7 such a declina-
tion should not subject the government to any greater restrictions on its
power to regulate commercial speech than if it had not declined. Regula-
tion of corporate commercial speech in the interest of consumers and the
public should not encounter the same First Amendment obstacles as does
similar regulation of the commercial speech of individuals.' Unlike indi-
viduals, business corporations have no "expressive" interest in noncom-
mercial speech; thus, the purely commercial aspect of corporate commer-
cial speech can be viewed as simply a commercial matter.' 9 Unless the
state's regulation can be seen as improperly selective in its impact on the
185. A number of cases suggest that such distinctions have a place in the regulation of commercial
speech even if not in the regulation of political speech. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2896 (1981); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 579-81 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1979).
It does not detract from this conclusion that the Metromedia plurality held that, because noncommer-
cial speech is entitled to heightened First Amendment protection, a government decision not to pro-
scribe commercial speech in certain circumstances constitutionally precludes proscription of noncom-
mercial speech in those same circumstances. Here, the values associated with commercial and political
speech are "inverted." Since government power over corporate speech is exercised to protect First
Amendment values for stockholders, and since protection of noncommercial speech is less costly than
protection of commercial speech, the teaching of Metromedia does not preclude the differential regula-
tion contemplated here. Cf. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (upholding
prohibition on political but not commercial ads on city buses).
186. See note 180 supra.
187. The government is not obliged to require a corporation that places magazine ads offering a
product for sale to obtain prior stockholder approval for the ads, even if their message has a noncom-
mercial import that stockholders might oppose.
188. But d. p. 267 supra (discussing cases).
189. In such circumstances, the audience's interest under the First Amendment rises to no higher
entitlement than the speaker's capacity to speak. See pp. 244-47 supra.
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noncommercial aspects of the speech,"' the regulation should be substan-
tially removed from the ambit of the First Amendment.
It can be argued that if the only basis for the state's power to regulate
any corporate speech is to protect stockholders' First Amendment rights,
then the state cannot regulate corporate commercial speech on some other
basis-that is, in the interest of consumers or the public generally. This
argument, however, pits First Amendment protection of commercial
speech for its noncommercial import against the stockholder's opportunity
to enjoy the protection of a state imposed consent requirement for corpo-
rate political or noncommercial speech. It implies that when a commercial
tincture is added to corporate political speech stockholders lose the statu-
tory protection to which they would otherwise be entitled. Expression of
the concededly "less protected" category of speech becomes the basis for
precluding statutory protection of stockholders' exercise of rights to ex-
pression of a "more protected" category of speech. The argument is a
"peculiar inversion of First Amendment values.""19 So long as considera-
tions of cost, or other neutral considerations having nothing to do with the
First Amendment, impel the government to decline to exercise its power to
protect stockholders' First Amendment interests in commercial speech, its
regulation of that speech in the interest of consumers and the public
should not become subject to constraints derived from the First
Amendment. 92
190. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 293-94 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Karst, supra note 55, at 29-30.
191. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2895 n.18 (1981) (quoting John
Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 16 (1st Cir. 1980)).
192. In any event, even if the theory underpinning the constitutionality of a government require-
ment of stockholder consent for corporate political speech mandates a similar requirement when regu-
lation of corporate commercial speech is proposed, a blanket requirement of consent for all commercial
speech is not constitutionally mandated. Even when a proposed regulation of corporate commercial
speech is grounded on stockholders' First Amendment rights, a case by case solution may be more
appropriate than a categorical solution. On particular issues, such as advertising addressed to minors
or the sale of certain drugs to anyone, the government may deem the product sufficiently dangerous
and corporate exposure to liability from the ad sufficiently great to justify imposing a stockholder
consent requirement, which will be valid as a protection of stockholders' rights. Indeed, a statute
requiring prior approval by stockholders for ads or other communications carrying particular commer-
cial messages, or requiring prior clearance of such messages with an administrative agency, could
effectively regulate the commercial content of the message without creating First Amendment
problems for the noncommercial aspects-if the regulation were otherwise neutral with respect to its
noncommercial content. Notwithstanding that such an approach may make the "cases" distinguishable
from each other only by reason of the commercial content of the communication, in any particular
case the consent requirement may well pass muster as a regulation of commercial speech. See Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2894-95 (1981). Of course, First Amendment
standards applicable to commercial speech must then test any statute that seeks to regulate commercial
speech that stockholders have approved.
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C. Government Regulation of Corporate Cultural Speech
Some forms of speech that are neither commercial nor political can con-
veniently be characterized as "cultural"-such as speech that is embodied
in scientific discussion, artistic production, creative expression, or en-
tertainment 193 that is too remote from social action or normative opinions
to be treated as political. Corporations may engage in such speech, with-
out either political or commercial coloration, when they support concerts,
theatrical performances, television shows, or the like. If such support can
be called speech, the question of obtaining stockholder consent for it re-
sembles the question of consent asked with respect to political speech.
Although the case for permitting a requirement of stockholder consent
for purely "cultural" expression is less compelling than for political
speech, 94 it is not at odds with either the language or the import of the
First Amendment to let the state define the terms on which corporations
can ask individual investors to consent to corporate cultural speech. Pro-
tecting the investor's freedom not to be forced to contribute to expositions
he opposes may legitimately permit the state to entitle him to make invest-
193. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 101 S. Ct. 2176 (1981) (live entertainment);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (theatrical performance); Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (books); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1952) (motion pictures); Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of American Science, 1979 U. ILL.
L.F. 1, 2-16 (science).
194. The varied considerations said to justify First Amendment protection of speech carry differ-
ent imperatives. Many commentators have urged that free speech is essential to the functioning of the
political process in a democratic society that elects its governors. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
(1948); Bork, supra note 154, at 23. Others have added the importance of untrammeled discussion as
a necessary safety valve for a stable political order. See T. EMERSON, supra note 54, at 7. Possibly a
less compelling imperative, but one affecting a considerably broader range of communications, is the
vindication of the personal autonomy of individual citizens, whether in expressing themselves, receiv-
ing the communications of others, or exchanging ideas. See Baker, supra note 88; Scanlon, A Theory
of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 215-22 (1972). A still different consideration is
the social interest in the pursuit of truth and the enrichment of the mind and spirit of mankind, which
cannot be optimally met when speech and inquiry are trammeled.
Of these considerations, the concern for personal autonomy may support First Amendment protec-
tion of communication that does no more than offer to exchange goods or services in a commercial
transaction. In addition, of course, many offers of such exchanges carry with them communication that
fulfills the other functions the First Amendment protects.To the extent that only matters of personal
autonomy are involved, some justification is required to hold that the speaker or listener is entitled to
a higher level of protection against government regulation in order to facilitate his enrichment from
communication than to facilitate his enrichment from the purchase or sale of material goods or ser-
vices. Whether or not such a justification can be found apart from the First Amendment, the freedom
of speech clause is not focused on speech merely facilitating commercial transactions. See note 180
supra. In any event, when there is a social interest in the speech, whether for political purposes, see
A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra, at 27; Bork, supra note 154, at 26, or for the advancement of truth, see J.
MILL, ON LIBERTY 9-32 (People's ed. 1873); Milton, Areopagitica, reprinted in THE TRADITION OF
FREEDOM 3, 3-32 (M. Mayer ed. 1957), a different and possibly more compelling case can be made
for the need for protection against governmental restriction. Moreover, to the extent that governmental
attacks on "nonpolitical" ideas are historically associated with conditions that produce repression of
political speech, it may be appropriate to accord each type of expression the same protection, and both
more protection, than commercial speech, which is not generally associated with similar political
repression.
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ments on terms that do not require him to yield his preferences as a pa-
tron of the arts or entertainment to corporate management or to his fellow
stockholders. Corporate sponsorship of cultural performances may be less
likely to collide with investors' preferences in such affairs than corporate
statements of social opinions or of political views. Nevertheless, there is a
residue of protectable investor speech that would justify a state in requir-
ing him to be given a voice in its utterance, or at least an uncluttered
choice not to contribute to it.
No less important, a requirement of individual investor approval of cor-
porate cultural speech would not impose on the listening world the same
obstacles to receipt of the message as would such a requirement for purely
commercial speech. The occasions for such cultural speech are not so fre-
quent or so unpredictable as to require prompt corporate decisions. More-
over, stockholders acting on their own, albeit collectively, can generate
funds for such performances in a fashion comparable to Political Action
Committees. Individual stockholder contributions to a separate fund for
such purposes may not be materially less likely than are contributions for
political speech, 95 and are significantly more likely to be made than are
contributions for purely commercial speech.
In sum, although corporate cultural speech is not as clearly a matter for
reference to the individual stockholder's choice nor as likely to be sup-
ported by stockholders acting apart from .the enterprise as is political
speech, it is not so far removed from the latter that comparable treatment
should be denied. It is not in any event a matter on which a court can say,
at least without evidence on the likelihood of stockholder action apart
from the corporation, that the state's interest in preserving the individual
investor's choices is not sufficient to permit a prohibition of corporate cul-
tural expenditures in the absence of stockholder consent.
D. Corporate Speech as One Form of Corporate Behavior
To conclude that the First Amendment does not preclude government
regulation of corporate commercial speech and that it does indeed support
prohibition of corporate political speech or even corporate cultural speech
on less than unanimous stockholder consent does not mean that there is no
constitutional protection for expression by business corporations. It merely
assimilates all types of corporate speech with other kinds of corporate be-
havior, and subjects the regulation of speech to the same constitutional
criteria that restrict regulation of other corporate activities.
195. If there is any significant difference in the likelihood of such funds being raised, the state
might choose to permit use of corporate offices and facilities to raise and manage the funds for cul-
tural, but not political, purposes.
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In a world in which corporate enterprise receives from government both
costly restrictions on, and substantial gifts to, its profitmaking capacity,
the corporation's ability to use its assets to influence government may well
be an aspect of corporate property rights. To what extent the government
may limit corporate capacity to seek to influence government for corporate
benefit presents a problem of property for the corporation, but of political
liberty for its stockholders. For an individual seeking government action in
order to obtain economic benefits for himself, these economic and political
rights may be inseparable, and the individual's economic preferences may
benefit from any protection the Constitution accords to the individual's
political rights; alternatively, the individual's economic preferences may be
modified because of the noneconomic goals he chooses. A business corpo-
ration, however, cannot legitimately pursue noneconomic goals, and unlike
an individual, its economic preferences and political power are feasibly
separable. The state thus may seek, in support of the individual stock-
holder's First Amendment interests, to restrict the corporation's political
activity. The question of the extent to which the state may thus validly
impose restrictions on the corporation's "property" rights is to be an-
swered by reference not to the First Amendment, but to other constitu-
tional provisions. By the same token, if corporate speech is regulated dif-
ferently from other kinds of corporate conduct, or if different types of
corporate speech by business corporations are regulated differently, the
exacting scrutiny the First Amendment demands need not measure the
validity of those regulatory differences, unless they conceal a hidden
agenda or some particular message is singled out for regulation because of
its content.'96
IV. Peripheral Considerations
A proposal to forbid only business corporations from engaging in non-
commercial speech without stockholder consent raises two other significant
problems: first, whether a constitutionally satisfactory line can be drawn
around business enterprises that are not engaged in the communications
business, and second, whether such a regulation may constitutionally be
confined to business corporations and not be extended to other enterprises.
196. To the extent that the statute in Bellotti singled out for prohibition not merely a particular
form of corporate political speech (referenda) but also a unique instance of that form (referendum on
a graduated income tax), it might properly have raised a question under the equal protection clause,
entirely apart from the First Amendment. See Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the
First Amendment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 29, 39-42 (1973).
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A. Enterprises in the Communications Business
The first question arises because of the possible constitutional distinc-
tion between the validity of a stockholder consent requirement for speech
by commercial corporations not engaged in the communications business
and such a requirement for newspaper or media corporations. The free-
dom of individuals to band together, in corporate form or otherwise, to
communicate with others derives from First Amendment protection of free
speech and freedom of the press." 7 As we have seen, First Amendment
considerations imply limits on the state's power to regulate internal deci-
sionmaking in those associations or communications enterprises, but those
limits need not restrict government regulation of such decisionmaking in
normal business enterprises. 98
It is not difficult to draft a regulatory statute that covers an automobile
company or a railroad but not a newspaper enterprise or an association
organized to affect public opinion and government action. Drawing the
line between solely commercial advertising agencies and trade journals
may pose a more difficult problem, and it may be improper to try to dif-
ferentiate between trade assocations formed for business purposes and
other associations. '9 But whatever may be the difficulties at the margin,
in general the distinction between communications businesses, which are
anchored in activities that First Amendment press and association rights
protect, and other businesses can be articulated in regulatory legislation.
More substantial problems arise, as the Chief Justice pointed out in
Bellotti,2°° when dealing with hybrids, like outdoor advertising companies
or conglomerates that include both a commercial venture like a steel com-
pany and a publication such as a daily newspaper, or that couple a soft
drink vendor with a broadcasting station or motion picture exhibitor., If
a media corporation's stockholders are constitutionally protected against a
requirement of supermajority consent for the corporation's speech, but the
stockholders of a steel company or soft drink vendor are entitled to benefit
197. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 102
S. Ct. 434. 437-38 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
428 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); T. EMERSON, supra note 54, at 432; L.
TRIBE, supra note 54, at 700-08.
198 See notes 87 & 89 supra.
199. Whatever may be the rights of trade associations and their individual members under the
First Amendment, see Swillinger, Federal Regulation of the Campaign Finance Activity of Trade
Associations-An Overview, 29 EMORY L. J. 395 (1980), they need not include a right to receive
corporate contributions made without stockholder consent. But cf Citizens Against Rent Control/
Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 102 S. Ct. 434 (1981) (limit on contributions to
committees formed to influence public referenda violates First Amendment). Whether the due process
clause requires a different result is another question.
200. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 796 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
201. E.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2886 (1981) (billboards for
commercial and noncommercial speech).
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from such a requirement, a problem of separation is posed. Should a
newspaper or periodical otherwise entitled to First Amendment protection
against a supermajority consent requirement become subject to greater re-
striction on its utterances if it is a division of a steel company? Alterna-
tively, should the stockholders of a steel company lose their entitlement to
the protection of a statutory consent requirement if the company acquires
a newspaper?
On one premise, when an investor becomes a stockholder in a steel
company with a newspaper division, he assumes the risk that he will have
his funds used for political speech he opposes, just as if he had decided to
become a stockholder of an enterprise that was only a newspaper com-
pany.2"' Under that view, the government may no more require his con-
sent for anything published in the newspaper in the former case than in
the latter. On a contrasting premise, however, the state could eliminate
the risk that an investor's funds will be used for political speech he op-
poses by subjecting publishing corporations that are parts of nonmedia
conglomerates to the same requirements of stockholder consent for publi-
cation that apply to other commercial corporations. Investors in non-affili-
ated publishing ventures would retain First Amendment rights unlimited
and unprotected by a stockholder consent requirement, while investors in
publishing enterprises affiliated with commercial ventures would not re-
tain such unlimited rights. Investors in nonpublishing ventures would not
be exposed to the risk-through acquisition of a media enterprise-of los-
ing the First Amendment protection of a consent requirement, while in-
vestors in publishing ventures would lose their possible First Amendment
entitlement to simple majority rule only if a sufficiently large number of
them sold their shares to give control of the corporation to a nonpublish-
ing business.
2 3
It is possible to avoid choosing between those two premises by requiring
stockholder consent for political speech only by the non-media corporation
or division of the conglomerate. But speech by the newspaper subsidiary
or division urging government policies that favor the steel business might
constitute evasion of the requirement of obtaining consent from stockhold-
ers of "the" corporation for political speech by the steel company. A possi-
ble solution for such evasion-if it is evasion-may be found by analogy
to the distinction drawn in Buckley v. Valeo between "truly" independent
expenditures and those "controlled by or coordinated with the candi-
202. This is true whether he bought stock of a steel company that later began to publish a news-
paper or bought stock of a steel company that already published a newspaper.
203. To be sure, this would obstruct a source of equity financing (i.e., conglomerates) for publish-
ing ventures. Whether doing so would restrict speech to an extent that cannot adequately be offset by
other equity financing raises questions that require further inquiry.
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date."2 °4 Legislation could provide that in order for the media division of
an enterprise to be free of a stockholder consent requirement, that division
must be publishing a bona fide publication of general circulation, not
merely a trade "give-away." The definitional problem is not without its
difficulties, but the distinction drawn in Buckley v. Valeo suggests that
they may be overcome.
B. Trade Unions and Other Associations
Particularly in view of the emerging First Amendment jurisprudence of
underinclusiveness, 0 ' the question remains whether remitting corporations
to the alternatives of stockholder consent for noncommercial speech or col-
lective action by contribution outside the corporate structure is constitu-
tionally offensive unless a similar requirement is imposed upon all other
associations, particularly trade unions. There is good reason to distinguish
between unions and large, publicly held business corporations, both in
terms of how their assets are generated and distributable, and how their
members vote for leadership and generally relate to the enterprise.20' Per-
haps the constitutional entitlement of union members in union shops to be
relieved of the obligation to pay for union expression of political views
they oppose implies constitutional permission for states to offer similar
protection to all union members by law. If so, the only significant question
is whether the particular techniques of relieving members of such pay-
ment obligations may differ among different kinds of organizations. Spe-
cifically, if proration of expenditures for political speech is permissible
among unions, is a different approach-prohibition of collective speech
without stockholder consent-a permissible technique for protecting stock-
holders of business corporations? Similarly, if a union-financed PAC is
authorized, may a corporate-financed PAC be prohibited?
Both unions and publicly held corporations promote the economic inter-
ests of their members and stockholders. But a great deal more is involved
in union membership than in investment in a publicly held corporation, in
terms of both exit capacity and participation in common social and educa-
tional activities. A rebate or proration process may be appropriate for a
member of a group that is often largely local and engages its membership
in active participation, where voting is by the person rather than by the
204. 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976). See Comment, Independent Political Committees and the Federal
Election Laws, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1981).
205. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 793 (1978).
206. See Lambert, note 2 supra, at 1049-50; Rauh, Legality of Union Political Expenditures, 34
S. CAL. L. REV. 152, 162 n.49 (1961); Comment, Of Politics, Pipefitters, and Section 610: Union
Political Contributions in Modern Context, 51 TEX. L. REV. 936, 981-83 (1973); Comment, supra
note 132, at 387.
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share, and from which exit is not easy."07 On the other hand, the remote-
ness of passive, dispersed, and essentially transient investors from the deci-
sionmaking process of a publicly held corporation may justify a govern-
ment's conclusion that the protection of a consent requirement coupled
with a stockholder-managed separate fund, rather than a rebate system, is
required in order to safeguard adequately the investor's political
"rights."2 8
Apart from any questions concerning what distinctions in the treatment
of corporations and unions are permissible, the Court in Bellotti regarded
as fatal defects the failure of the statute to distinguish between large and
small or publicly held and privately held corporations, and its failure to
cover non-corporate "entities or organized groups in which numbers of
persons may hold an interest or membership, and which often have re-
sources comparable to those of large corporations."2 9 Constitutionally
valid distinctions can readily be drawn between publicly held corporations
and privately held enterprises. Whether the line is that defined by federal
securities laws, by various state law definitions of close corporations, by
the fact of listing on a national securities exchange, or otherwise, existing
laws illustrate a range of constitutionally unchallengeable distinctions that
permit statutes to protect investors in publicly- held ventures in ways that
investors in "private" enterprises do not need because they can protect
themselves.210 These laws furnish adequate ground for suitable distinctions
to be made to protect stockholders under the First Amendment.
Whether or not the suggestion in Bellotti that a judgment to cover pub-
licly held corporations cannot constitutionally be made without also cover-
ing publicly held real estate partnerships,211 business trusts, or some
vaguely suggested "other associations" is meant as a real distinction, legis-
lation covering all for-profit enterprises (whether corporate or not) that fit
207. See Comment, The Regulation of Union Political Activity: Majority and Minority Rights
and Remedies, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 386, 411 (1977).
208. That a rebate scheme may be more suitable for unions than for corporations is also suggested
by differences in the financial consequences of such a scheme-with respect, for example, to the tax
consequences to investors or infeasibility to pensioners of receiving the rebate and the difficulty that a
separate segregated fund, in lieu of union dues, might cause for unions. See International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 771 (1961); Beck v. CWA, 468 F. Supp. 93 (D. Md. 1979)
(ordering restitution of fees union improperly collected); Ball v. City of Detroit, 84 Mich. App. 383,
269 N.W.2d 607 (1978) (ordering payment of union dues into escrow account during lawsuit); Sulli-
van, Freedom of Association and the Public Sector Agency Shop: Ball v. Detroit and Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, 85 DICK. L. REV. 21, 46-47 (1980).
209. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 793 (1978). See Bolton, supra note 3, at 414-15.
210. In private corporations the distorting effect of the proxy system in favor of non-owning man-
agement is minimal, and stockholders are able to participate in decisionmaking or to contract more
realistically for restraints on the use of their assets by management or by majorities.
211. A state could make the rational judgment that real estate syndications tend to involve sophis-
ticated investors seeking tax shelters, who can look after themselves better than stockholders of lesser
sophistication who invest in corporations without tax-shelter bait.
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a "publicly held" description can avoid its thrust. Notwithstanding sug-
gestions to the contrary,"2 large publicly held corporations may also read-
ily be distinguished from nonprofit enterprises and from "special interest"
groups, whether they have large treasuries and represent special economic
interests, like the chamber of commerce, the AMA, or the aerospace trade
association, or whether they are less sectarian and less well-financed
groups like the Natural Resources Defense Council. To the extent that
such enterprises are organized for the purpose of exercising the very
speech the First Amendment seeks to protect, they may well be entitled to
different treatment in such matters than are business corporations.213 Fur-
thermore, to the extent that their form contemplates voting by members
rather than by economic weight, a less compelling case can be made for
protection of dissenters than in the case of the business corporation.214
While the matter may yield a different conclusion on further inquiry,
such as a requirement that distinctions be drawn by mode of member vot-
ing rather than by the nonprofit category, nothing that commentators have
said or that the Court has opined requires, under the First Amendment,
the equal protection clause, or otherwise, that strictures on speech applied
to business corporations be equally applied to all collectives or groups. Of
course, if choices are made to subject some nonprofits but not others to
strictures applicable to business corporations, serious questions might
arise. But nothing in the received learning or the analysis of commentators
requires "special interest" PACs to be subject to the same restrictions that
may be applied to corporate PACs.
Conclusion
It is not the purpose of this article to prescribe a legislative program to
regulate corporate political activity or corporate speech-whether politi-
cal, commercial, cultural, or otherwise. The effort, rather, is to establish
that with respect to publicly held business corporations not engaged in the
communications business, the First Amendment does not preclude a gov-
ernment requirement of stockholder consent that may effectively prohibit
either some or all noncommercial speech. To be sure, any program that
seeks to delineate between political or noncommercial speech subject to a
shareholder consent requirement and other speech not subject to such a
212. See Bolton, supra note 3, at 414-17.
213. See California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 101 S. Ct. 2712, 2723-24 (1981); p. 260 & note 89
supra.
214. Cf Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 48 A.2d 754 (1946) (suit by bar association mem-
bers to prevent association from promoting election of political candidates dismissed); LaBelle v. Hen-
nepin County Bar Ass'n, 206 Minn. 290, 288 N.W. 788 (1939) (bar association plebiscite on judicial
nominees does not violate corrupt practices statute).
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requirement faces a difficult task of definition. But, notwithstanding
problems at the margin, constitutionally valid lines can be drawn.
That a distinction between commercial speech and noncommercial
speech is constitutionally feasible, indeed in some sense required, is an
inescapable proposition. If the First Amendment permits a unanimous
stockholder consent requirement to be imposed on the latter kind of corpo-
rate speech, it does so without at the same time requiring it to be imposed
on the former. If the government opts not to protect stockholders, by de-
clining to require their consent for the noncommercial import of corporate
commercial speech, First Amendment considerations should not constrain
its power to regulate corporate commercial speech in the interests of con-
sumers and the public, at least where there is no suggestion that the regu-
lation serves an improper hidden agenda.
The considerations discussed herein do not deny corporations other con-
stitutional entitlements-for example, under the due process or equal pro-
tection clauses-with respect to corporate speech, or permit requirements
of shareholder consent for such speech to be so onerous as to offend such
constitutional provisions." But, in the absence of a suggestion of discrimi-
natory treatment of particular content, the validity of restrictions that the
government may impose on corporate speech in order to protect share-
holders' First Amendment interests should not be subject to the most de-
manding standards of judicial review invoked under the First Amendment.
Particularly with respect to corporate commercial speech, the First
Amendment should not become the vehicle for restoring the lenses of the
Lochner court to judicial scrutiny of economic regulation of either legisla-
tive or executive origin.
215. For example, a prohibition against officers testifying, without stockholder consent, before a
legislative committee in support of or in opposition to legislation affecting the enterprise might be a
denial of due process, as would such a prohibition against initiating or testifying in litigation. Perhaps,
however, business corporations may be required to consult stockholders in matters left to the political
process, such as legislation, even if they are not required to do so in matters relating to litigation.
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